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1 Introduction
Many distributive issues involve situations of unequal endowments that call for compen-
sating transfers. When the endowments themselves are transferable, things are relatively
simple, at least in the first best context, because transfers can remove the initial inequal-
ity. But in other situations endowments are not transferable, or are only transferable
at a prohibitive cost, because of the available technology or because of prevailing moral
constraints. For instance, between individuals, features of human capital like education,
social background, genetic endowment, health or bodily characteristics are seldom consid-
ered as being transferable. Between regions or countries features like natural environment,
landscape, population characteristics, even industry, are, in many decision contexts, not
modifiable. In such cases, transfers will not remove all the inequalities but will compen-
sate endowment inequality by a countervailing resource inequality. Sometimes things are
still simple because there is an obvious index of performance which measures how much of
compensation is achieved. For instance, if equality of weight between racers is sought, it
is easy to put artificial weight on lighter racers so as to achieve the desired equality, even
though transferring weight is in itself impossible. If equality of welfare between individu-
als is the social objective, and there is an accepted measure of welfare with interpersonal
comparability, then it is relatively easy to devise transfers of resources in the direction
of such equality, and, if full inequality is not possible because initial inequalities are too
great (or because of second-best impediments), resorting to the maximin criterion seems
reasonable.
In many contexts such an undisputed index of compensation is not available. There
may be for instance diﬀerent evaluations of the unequal endowments, leading to a prefer-
ence aggregation problem. Moreover, it is often the case that among initial characteristics
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that make individuals (or groups, regions, countries, etc.) unequal, some do not call for
compensation, in view of the prevailing moral sentiment. For instance, a non-negligible
part of welfare inequalities comes from bodily beauty and attractiveness, although it is
seldom argued that such inequalities should induce transfers. Whatever the reason (e.g.
organizing transfers on this basis might be damaging to self-respect), this entails that indi-
viduals bear the consequences of such inequalities. Similarly, the exercise of responsibility
is often thought to generate legitimate inequalities. The classical example of expensive
tastes (Arrow 1973, Dworkin 1981a) is a case in point. An expensive taste for rare food
or extravagant activities is a kind of handicap in view of achieving happiness, although it
may be argued that such a handicap is less of an urgency than bodily disability, because
individuals must somehow assume responsibility for their goals. When the disputed char-
acteristic is fully chosen by individuals, it is also often argued that they should bear the
consequences, even disregarding the obvious underlying moral hazard issue. Similar con-
siderations arise in the case of other entities like regions or countries. It may sometimes be
defended that federal or national subsidies to a region should not cater to inequalities due
to consumption patterns, pollution behavior, religious practices, etc. In all such cases,
the scale of compensation for illegitimate inequalities is diﬃcult to assess because the
individual index of performance typically mixes the eﬀects of the various characteristics,
those that justify compensation and those that do not.
The literature under review in this chapter deals with this problem of compensation.
The origins of this literature can be traced back to four diﬀerent sources. First, the
utilitarian approach to this issue has been studied by Arrow (1971) and Sen (1973), who
pointed out the paradox that a handicapped individual is likely to have a lower marginal
utility and therefore, by application of the utilitarian criterion, to receive less resources
than a better-oﬀ individual. As an antidote to this unappealing consequence, Sen proposed
the “Weak Equity Axiom”, requiring that when an individual has a lower level of utility
than another at all levels of income, the optimal allocation must not give less income to
him than to the other.
Second, the theory of social choice, as early as in Arrow’s seminal monograph (Arrow
1963), has called attention on the issue of inequalities due to personal characteristics,
and the notion of extended sympathy was coined to make it possible to evaluate such
inequalities. But it did not clearly identify tools to deal with the separation between
characteristics that call for compensation and other characteristics, and that was indeed
a diﬃcult exercise in the purely abstract framework of social choice, in which transfers of
resources are not even explicitly described.
The third origin of the literature presented here is the theory of equity, which was
formulated in economic models and therefore was equipped with more precise concepts
to evaluate inequalities. In Kolm (1972), a general approach to the assessment of equity
based on partial sets of individual characteristics was already proposed, with a full range
of criteria going from the most restrictive, equity as No-Envy on resources, to the most
comprehensive, justice as equal utility. But this first step was largely ignored, although
the related issue of compensating for productivity handicaps was raised by Pazner and
Schmeidler (1974) in the model of production with unequal skills, and their negative result
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about the general existence of eﬃcient and envy-free allocations triggered some research
eﬀort, but the resulting literature simply tried to define weaker notions of equity, without
relating this diﬃculty to the general compensation problem.
The fourth source of inspiration was the Rawlsian tradition in political philosophy,
initiated by Rawls (1971) and developed by Dworkin (1981a,b), Sen (1985), Arneson
(1989), Cohen (1989) and van Parijs (1995), and also commented upon by Roemer (1985a,
1986). This philosophical literature gave a strong endorsement to egalitarian goals, but
made the point that it may be reasonable to deny compensation for some welfare deficits,
laying the stress on the importance of compensating individuals only for handicaps for
which they should not be deemed responsible.
We now briefly summarize the main insights obtained in the more recent theory of
compensation, and introduce some basic concepts. One first contribution of the literature
reviewed here is a distinction of several relevant ethical issues in the problem of compen-
sation. At first glance, it may appear that the goal of compensating for handicaps, or
equalizing opportunities, is a simple goal. But consider the following example.
Example 1. Suppose that individual welfare is determined by the formula
u = (x+ y) z,
where x, y and z are real numbers. The quantity x denotes an external resource allocated
by redistributive policies, y is social background, and z is a measure of personal eﬀort
and merit. Assume that y and z are independently distributed, and that each of these
two variables takes on the values 1 and 3 in equal proportions. The population is then
partitioned into four subgroups of equal size, as depicted in the following table:
y \ z 1 3
1 the “undeserving poor” the “deserving poor”
3 the “undeserving rich” the “deserving rich”
We assume that the per capita amount of available external resource is 4, and that it can be
freely allocated among the four subgroups. Let us consider that the goal of redistributive
policy is to compensate for inequalities in social background y, whereas inequalities due
to personal merit z are deemed acceptable. What kind of policy is adequate in this
perspective? A natural candidate is to seek equality of x+ y across all individuals. This
is achieved by policy A described in the following table:
Policy A
y \ z 1 3
1
x = 5
u = 6
x = 5
u = 18
3
x = 3
u = 6
x = 3
u = 18
Assuming that individuals are in control of variable z, one can consider in this case that
equality of opportunity is perfectly achieved, since every individual, after transfer, has a
welfare function equal to u = 6z.
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But the simplicity of this solution hides several diﬀerent underlying ethical values. In
order to see this, consider an alternative policy:
Policy B
y \ z 1 3
1
x = 2
u = 3
x = 8
u = 27
3
x = 0
u = 3
x = 6
u = 27
This alternative policy no longer equalizes x+ y across individuals, and displays a strong
bias in favor of the “deserving” subpopulation. But one can still argue that it compen-
sates for social background y, and even that it equalizes opportunities. Indeed, in any
subpopulation with equal z, social background is not a source of welfare inequality under
policy B, and every individual, after transfer, faces the same welfare function: u = 3 if
z = 1; u = 27 if z = 3.
These examples of policies show that compensating for inequalities in variable y does
not require equalizing x + y over the whole population, but only within the “deserving”
subpopulation and within the “undeserving” subpopulation, separately. This, by itself, is
generally insuﬃcient to fully determine what redistributive policy is the best. Additional
ethical principles are needed to determine how to allocate resources between the “deserv-
ing” and the “undeserving” subpopulations. These additional principles will define the
appropriate relationship between merit (z) and welfare (u) over the population. In brief,
they will decide how merit should be rewarded. The two policies proposed in this exam-
ple illustrate two diﬀerent “reward principles”. Policy A illustrates an approach which
is prominent in the philosophical literature as well as in the literature surveyed in the
beginning of this chapter. It expresses a desire of neutrality by avoiding any redistribu-
tion on the basis of merit. If, as expressed above, inequalities due to personal merit z are
deemed acceptable, it may seem quite reasonable not to interfere with the consequences
of such inequalities. The population is then left to bear the consequences of diﬀerential
merit, without any bias in favor of a subpopulation. Policy B, in contrast, does display
a bias in favor of the deserving subpopulation, and such a bias may be justified by a
sum-utilitarian view of social welfare. Indeed, policy B maximizes the sum of individual
utilities, under the constraint that social background inequalities be fully neutralized. The
deserving subpopulation is favored under this policy because, by its own eﬀort and merit,
it is more able to transform resources into welfare. Measuring social welfare by the sum is
usually considered appropriate when one has no preference for equality in the distribution
of welfare, and since inequalities due to diﬀerential merit are deemed acceptable it may
seem reasonable to adopt a utilitarian approach toward such inequalities.
This example highlights the main ethical principles which will be relevant in this
chapter. First, there is a “principle of compensation” (Barry 1991, Fleurbaey 1995a),
whose limited and separate scope is to neutralize the diﬀerential influence over agents’
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outcomes of the characteristics which elicit compensation.1 Informally, it is expressed in
terms of making sure that such characteristics do not entail by themselves inequalities
in final outcomes, or simply that opportunities are made equal. This may be translated
into the requirement that any pair of agents who diﬀer only in characteristics to be
compensated should obtain equal outcomes. It is also present in the idea that if all
unequal characteristics were to be compensated, full equality of outcomes should be the
goal. And it will also be shown below to underlie the idea that changes in the population
profile of characteristics to be compensated should benefit or harm all individuals, in
solidarity.
Then, there are various independent reward principles, and two of them are significant
in the literature. The first principle, illustrated by policy A in Example 1, is to neutrally
respect inequalities entailed by other characteristics. It is usually introduced through
the argument that diﬀerences in such characteristics should not entail any compensatory
redistribution, or that agents who diﬀer only in such characteristics should be submitted
to equal treatment in terms of resource allocation or transfers. It is also behind the idea
that if all agents were identical in the characteristics which elicit compensation, there
would be no reason to make any transfer between the agents. It may also be shown
to underlie various requirements that the redistributive policy should be independent in
some way of the population profile of characteristics which do not elicit compensation.
This reward principle was called the “principle of natural reward” in Fleurbaey (1995a), in
reference to the fact that by taking a neutral attitude one does not advocate any “artificial”
reward favoring the agents who exercise their responsibility in a particular way.2 This
principle receives a strong backing in the philosophical literature. In particular, Rawls’s
and Dworkin’s theories of equality of resources3 are built around the core principle that
once resources are properly equalized, just institutions may let individual welfare be freely
determined by the exercise of individual responsibility in the formation of one’s view of
life, personal ambitions and goals. No favor should be granted to any subpopulation in
virtue of how it exercises its responsibility in this respect. Although Arneson and Cohen
disagree with Rawls’s and Dworkin’s definition of the sphere of individual responsibility,4
they also endorse a similar reward principle.5
1This is to be distinguished from the Kaldor-Hicks “Compensation Principle”, which has to do with
the gains of a subpopulation compensating the losses of the rest of the population.
2Barry (1991) proposed calling it “the principle of responsibility”, and a similar terminology is retained
in part of the literature reviewed here, e.g. Fleurbaey and Maniquet (1998), Maniquet (2002). This raises
the issue of deciding whether “artificial” rewards really impede the exercise of responsibility. Imagine that
transfers are made so as to make the reward scheme steeper than it would naturally be (eﬀort is rewarded
more than naturally). This is exemplified by policy B in Example 1. It is dubious that this diminishes the
degree of responsibility that agents can exercise, although this violates the principle of natural reward.
3See in particular Rawls (1982) and Dworkin (1981b, 2000).
4Instead of considering that individuals should be responsible for their ambitions and use of resources,
they argue that individuals should be deemed responsible only for their genuine choices (ambitions and
preferences may be influenced in various ways, in which case, according to Arneson and Cohen, individuals
should not be held responsible for such characteristics).
5 ‘We should ... compensate only for those welfare deficits which are not in some way traceable to the
individual’s choices’ (Cohen 1989, p. 914). ‘Distributive justice does not recommend any intervention by
5
The alternative, utilitarian, reward principle (illustrated by policy B in Example 1)
is adopted by a few authors in the literature on equality of opportunities.6 The idea is
that, since inequalities due to characteristics of responsibility are acceptable, the social
objective should simply be to maximize the sum of individual outcomes, once the undue
influence of characteristics calling for compensation has properly been taken into account.
There are diﬀerent ways in which this undue influence can be reckoned, and therefore dif-
ferent modified utilitarian social welfare functions in this branch of the literature, to be
presented below. Interestingly, the thesis that it would be legitimate to make transfers not
only toward those with characteristics to be compensated, but also in favor of those who
exercise responsibility in a “good” way (that is, in such a way as to increase their mar-
ginal utility), seems never to have been supported explicitly in the relevant philosophical
literature. The contrast between the natural reward principle and the utilitarian reward
principle reflects a deep opposition, in welfare economics and political philosophy, between
two views of what it means to be indiﬀerent to inequalities. One view, which inspires the
natural reward principle, is based on the libertarian principle that the state should then
remain neutral and refrain from tampering with the distribution. The alternative view,
based on the utilitarian doctrine, is that the state may intervene and possibly alter the
distribution, in order to promote the global good.
The literature to be reviewed here has clarified the distinctions and logical indepen-
dence between the principle of compensation and the reward principles. In addition, it
has also revealed that there exist tensions between the principle of compensation and the
reward principles. In particular, as explained below in various contexts, one often finds
logical incompatibility between axioms representing the principle of compensation and
axioms representing the natural reward principle. Roughly, the reason is that transfers
designed to fully compensate for undue inequalities may sometimes automatically alter
the distribution in a way that is clearly non-neutral. This happens when the influence
of characteristics which elicit compensation is not separable from the influence of the
society to correct inequalities that arise through the voluntary choice or fault of those who end up with
less, so long as it is proper to hold the individuals responsible for the voluntary choice or faulty behavior
that gives rise to the inequalities.’ (Arneson 1990, p. 176 –see however Arneson 2000, p. 344 for a more
nuanced view) These authors do not seem to consider the possibility of a policy like policy B in Example
1, which actually widens inequalities due to responsibility characteristics. Consider a modified version
of Example 1, with u = 20 − 100/(x + y)z. In this modified example, a low utility now implies a high
marginal utility. Then policy A, in which only inequalities due to y are corrected, leads to u = 3.33 for
z = 1 and u = 14.44 for z = 3. In contrast, a utilitarian planner maximizing the sum of utilities under
the constraint that a poor receives two units more of x than a rich (compensation for y) would choose
the policy B’:
Policy B’
y \ z 1 3
1
x = 6.61
u = 6.86
x = 3.39
u = 12.41
3
x = 4.61
u = 6.86
x = 1.39
u = 12.41
partially correcting inequalities due to z as well because the undeserving have a high marginal utility.
6See in particular Roemer (1993, 1998), Van de gaer (1993), Vallentyne (2002).
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other individual characteristics. This raises an interesting ethical dilemma, because when
the incompatibility arises the social allocation of resources has to reflect one of the two
ethical principles (compensation, natural reward) more than the other one. One might
think that the principle of compensation, largely endorsed in the literature, is obviously
the one which should be given priority in such a conflict. But this is far from obvious, as
illustrated in the following example.
Example 2. This example retains the main data of Example 1, but the welfare function
is now modified into
u = xz + y.
One interpretation of this function is that personal eﬀort z makes one more sensitive to
external resources x. For instance, the deserving poor (y = 1, z = 3) respond very well
to transfers of resources (u = 3x + 1), whereas such transfers are rather ineﬀective for
undeserving poor (for whom y = z = 1, so that u = x+ 1).
Here is a policy which fully achieves compensation, so that inequalities in y do not
create welfare diﬀerences, and every individual faces the same ex post welfare function:
u = 6 if z = 1; u = 14 if z = 3.
Policy A1
y \ z 1 3
1
x = 5
u = 6
x = 4.333
u = 14
3
x = 3
u = 6
x = 3.666
u = 14
This policy is not strongly biased in favor of the deserving or the undeserving, since both
subpopulations receive half of the total resources. Nonetheless, within the poor subpop-
ulation (y = 1), a bias seems to be expressed in favor of the undeserving (who receive a
larger x than the deserving), whereas the reverse occurs within the rich subpopulation.
Moreover, one may object to fully compensating the undeserving poor. Indeed, if such
people are responsible for the low z = 1, which makes their welfare little sensitive to
transfers, one may question compensating them not only for a low y, but also, indirectly,
for a low z. Similarly, one may object to full compensation among the deserving, and
consider that the remarkable eﬀort made by the deserving poor is not a reason to give
them a smaller diﬀerential of resources (the diﬀerential of x between poor and rich is 2
among the undeserving, and only 2/3 among the deserving).
A similar objection could be made under a diﬀerent interpretation of the variables.
Suppose that the welfare function xz+y reflects subjective preferences about combinations
of external and internal resources (x, y). Under this new interpretation, the undeserving
are simply y-lovers, whereas the deserving are x-lovers. The undeserving poor consider
that they have a deep handicap, whereas the deserving poor consider that their handicap
is mild. A full compensation policy such as A1 tries to cater to both opinions at the same
time, giving a strong transfer to poor y-lovers, and a small one to poor x-lovers. One
may object that there is no reason to accept two diﬀerent evaluations of the handicap
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of having a low y, and that society should define its transfer policy on the basis of a
consistent evaluation of handicaps.7
Whatever the interpretation of the example, such objections to full compensation may
lead to an alternative policy like the following one, which is more in line with the natural
reward principle.
Policy A2
y \ z 1 3
1
x = 4.5
u = 5.5
x = 4.5
u = 14.5
3
x = 3.5
u = 6.5
x = 3.5
u = 13.5
In this policy, the poor receive the same diﬀerential amount of x, independently of their
merit (or preference, under the alternative interpretation). This particular policy performs
compensation under the assumption that everyone could have z = 2. Indeed with this
value of z, a poor would get u = 2 × 4.5 + 1 = 10, just like a rich, for whom u =
2× 3.5 + 3 = 10. As a consequence, of course, compensation is no longer achieved within
each subpopulation. The undeserving poor are not fully compensated, the deserving poor
are more than compensated.
Notice that policy A1 is not the only one to achieve compensation, and similarly, policy
A2 is not the only one to comply with the idea of natural reward. As explained below,
one may narrow the set of admissible policies by combining one of the two principles with
axioms expressing mild versions of the other principle.
There appears to be also a dilemma between the principle of compensation and the
utilitarian reward principle, since the modified utilitarian social welfare functions often
fail to select allocations which achieve full compensation. This is explained below.
Finally, the contribution of the theory of compensation is not only a clarification of
the concepts and an analysis of ethical dilemmas and conflicts of values. It has produced a
variety of solutions, allocation rules and social objectives, which embody the relevant eth-
ical principles and determine precise ways of defining appropriate compensatory policies.
Many results take the form of axiomatic characterizations, which are helpful in showing
the logical links between some basic ethical principles, expressed in various axioms, and
possible redistributive solutions. Some of these solutions are actually observed in various
institutions and policies, and this literature contributes to enlarging the set of options
available to policy-makers confronted with compensation issues.
This chapter is organized as follows. The next section (Sect. 2) reviews the results
obtained in the basic model describing the case when there is no production, and only
one good (such as money) is transferable in order to compensate for handicaps (as in
Examples 1 and 2 above). Section 3 is devoted to the Mirrlees-Pazner-Schmeidler model
of cooperative production in which the individual characteristics to be compensated are
unequal productive skills. Section 4 is devoted to the literature which adopts the utili-
7For such a criticism of the principle of compensation, see van Parijs (1997).
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tarian kind of reward or, more generally, deals with an abstract social choice framework.
Section 5 reviews other related parts of the literature.8
The main mathematical conventions and notations, in this chapter, are as follows. The
set of real (resp. non-negative, positive) numbers isR (resp. R+, R++). Vector inequalities
are denoted ≥, >,À, and set inclusion is denoted ⊆, ⊂. The symbol ≥lexdenotes the
leximin (lexicographic maximin) criterion applied to vectors of real numbers. Namely,
x ≥lex x0 if the smallest component of x is greater than the smallest component of x0, or
they are equal and the second smallest component of x is greater than the second smallest
component of x0, and so on. A function f : An → A is said to be idempotent if for all
a ∈ A, f(a, ..., a) = a. For any set N, let ΠN denote the set of permutations over N (i.e.,
bijections from N to N). For any function f : A → B, let f(A) ⊆ B denote the range
of f. An ordering is a binary relation that is reflexive and transitive. For any set A, #A
denotes its cardinal.
2 Fair monetary compensation
This section deals with the case when the transferable resource by which compensation
of handicaps is performed is not produced and is one-dimensional.9 This is relevant to
various practical problems of compensation, especially the allocation of a central budget
to several agencies or administrative units with some autonomy in management. It may be
applied to social assistance toward disabled individuals when the impact of redistribution
on earning incentives is null (e.g. the population under consideration does not work) or
may be ignored (fixed labor supply). Such impact on incentives is taken into account in
the model studied in the next section.
This section starts with a description of the model. We then list the various solutions
which have been proposed for the compensation problem, and review the axiomatic analy-
sis of the relevant ethical principles. The last subsection focuses on the particular case of
quasi-linear utilities, which has attracted much attention in the literature.
2.1 The model
There are several ways of modelling this problem, which are almost equivalent. One pos-
sibility is to have an ordering º defined over triples (x, y, z), where x is an amount of
transferable resource, y is a characteristic which elicits compensation, and z a characteris-
tic which does not elicit compensation. This ordering describes the agents’ performances,
and
(xi, yi, zi) º (xj, yj, zj)
8In Fleurbaey (1998) one can find another survey which emphasizes the link between the economic and
the philosophical literatures. See also Peragine (1999), for a survey focused on the notion of opportunity,
and Suzumura and Yoshihara (2000).
9The literature reviewed in this section includes Bossert (1995), Bossert and Fleurbaey (1996), Bossert,
Fleurbaey and Van de gaer (1999), Cappelen and Tungodden (2002, 2003b), Fleurbaey (1994, 1995c,d),
Iturbe (1997), Iturbe and Nieto (1996), Maniquet (2002), Moulin (1994), Sprumont (1997) and Tungodden
(2005).
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means that agent i is at least as well-oﬀ as agent j. One may also use a function repre-
senting this ordering: f(xi, yi, zi) is then agent i’s outcome or performance (well-being,
income, etc.). One may also simply write this function as ui(xi, yi), where the mapping
ui(., .) itself incorporates the influence of parameter zi.
Another approach, adopted by Fleurbaey (1994, 1995d) and Iturbe and Nieto (1996),
simply endows every agent with preferences over pairs (x, y). This approach is more par-
simonious in terms of information, because no interpersonal comparison of outcome is
made in this case. Notice, however, that preferences over (x, y) contain more than the
usual consumer preferences over commodities, since y is a non-transferable personal char-
acteristic.
It turns out that, whatever the approach, the main solutions to this problem, anyway,
do not use more information than these personal, ordinal non-comparable, preferences
over pairs (x, y). Since this can be viewed as an interesting ethical conclusion in itself, we
adopt here the richer framework with fully interpersonally comparable utilities ui(xi, yi)
so as to highlight the way in which interpersonal comparisons of well-being are eventually
ruled out, somewhat paradoxically, in the compensation problem.
An economy is denoted e = (yN , uN ,Ω), where N = {1, ..., n} is a finite population
of size n, yN = (y1, ..., yn) is the profile of characteristics to be compensated (hereafter
called “talents”), uN = (u1, ..., un) is the profile of utility functions, and Ω ∈ R++ is the
amount of resource to be allocated among the population. An agent’s utility function ui,
for i ∈ N , is defined over pairs (x, y), where x is a quantity of resource and y a personal
talent, and, since utilities are assumed to be fully interpersonally comparable, we can, for
instance, say that agent i is at least as well-oﬀ as agent j if
ui(xi, yi) ≥ uj(xj, yj).
A pair (xi, yi) will be called hereafter a bundle of “extended resources”.
An allocation is a vector xN = (x1, ..., xn) ∈ Rn+. It is feasible if
P
i∈N xi = Ω. The
set of feasible allocations for the economy e is denoted F (e). Notice that, when utility
functions are increasing in x, all feasible allocations are Pareto-optimal in this setting
(since we did not assume free disposal in the definition of feasibility).
An allocation rule is a correspondence S such that for every e in a given domain, S(e)
is a subset of feasible allocations in e. Although the literature reviewed in this section
has almost exclusively dealt with allocation rules,10 we will here make allusions to social
ordering functions as well. A social ordering function is a mapping R such that for every
e in a given domain, R(e) is a complete ordering over the set of allocations Rn+.We write
xNR(e)x0N (resp., xNP (e)x0N , xNI(e)x0N) to mean that xN is weakly better than x0N (resp.,
strictly better than, indiﬀerent to). The social ordering function R is said to rationalize
the allocation rule S on some domain if for every e in this domain,
S(e) = {xN ∈ F (e) | ∀x0N ∈ F (e), xNR(e)x0N}.
The main domain of economies considered here, denoted E , is the set of economies
such that: n ≥ 2; yN ∈ Y n, where Y is a given set with at least two elements; for all i,
10The exceptions are Bossert, Fleurbaey and Van de gaer (1999) and Maniquet (2002).
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ui : R+×Y → R is continuous and strictly increasing in the first argument. Let U denote
the set of such utility functions.
This model bears a strong similarity with the model of fair allocation of indivisible
goods with money, studied by Svensson (1983) and others. The current model studies
what would happen in that model if indivisible goods were already allocated arbitrarily,
and only money could still be transferred. The current model also bears some similarity
with the bankruptcy model (O’Neill 1982, Aumann and Maschler 1985, Young 1987), in
which some money must be allocated on the basis of claims. The current model represents
the claims not as simple and fixed demands of money, but as expressions of needs and
preferences. On these two related models, see Thomson (this volume).
2.2 Fairness as No-Envy, and related solutions
A central notion in the literature on fair allocations11 is No-Envy, suggested by Foley
(1967) and analyzed by Kolm (1972), Pazner and Schmeidler (1974) and Varian (1974).
In brief, No-Envy is obtained when no agent would rather have another’s bundle of re-
sources. This notion appears to be very relevant to the problem of compensation, but
some precautions must be taken in its application. Indeed, in the current model one can
apply the No-Envy requirement in two ways, either on external resources only:
∀i, j, ui(xi, yi) ≥ ui(xj, yi),
or on extended bundles:12
∀i, j, ui(xi, yi) ≥ ui(xj, yj).
The first option is inappropriate, since in this model it is equivalent to
∀i, j, xi ≥ xj,
and therefore entails xi = Ω/n for all i, which prevents any compensation of inequalities
in y. In contrast, the second option is quite reasonable as an expression of the principle of
compensation as well as of the principle of natural reward.13 In line with compensation,
two agents i, j with the same utility function ui = uj will end up with equal utility levels:
ui(xi, yi) ≥ ui(xj, yj)
uj(xj, yj) ≥ uj(xi, yi)
¾
⇒ ui(xi, yi) = uj(xj, yj),
11This literature is surveyed in Thomson (this volume).
12Under the alternative formulation ui = f(xi, yi, zi), one can think of a third kind of application:
∀i, j, f(xi, yi, zi) ≥ f(xj , yj , zj),
which directly implies full equality of utilities over the population.
13Apart from Kolm (1972), in which No-Envy is considered for any combination of external resources
and personal characteristics, early attempts to apply the notion of No-Envy to the compensation of hand-
icaps were problematic. Champsaur and Laroque (1981) limited the No-Envy test to external resources
and concluded negatively but unsurprisingly the impossibility of making income transfers in favor of
handicapped agents. Roemer (1985b) applied the No-Envy test to extended resources but failed to allow
people to feel envy for others’ personal characteristics, therefore concluding also negatively about the
compensation performed through application of the No-Envy test (see Fleurbaey (1994) for a discussion).
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implying full compensation between them. And in line with natural reward, two agents
with the same talent yi = yj will receive the same resource:
ui(xi, yi) ≥ ui(xj, yj)
uj(xj, yj) ≥ uj(xi, yi)
¾
⇒ xi ≥ xj
xj ≥ xi
¾
⇒ xi = xj,
which prevents any biased transfer between agents who diﬀer only in their utility function.
This can be illustrated with Example 1.
Example 1 (pursued). When agent i has a utility function ui(x, y) = (x+ y) zi, the
No-Envy condition applied to extended resources implies
∀i, j, xi + yi ≥ xj + yj,
which entails equality of x+ y over the whole population, as performed by policy A. This
policy is the only one to comply with the No-Envy condition.
In summary, No-Envy is a test of equality of resources, and can be used as a test of
compensation provided it bears on extended resources.
No-Envy Allocation Rule (SNE, Foley 1967, Roemer 1985b, Fleurbaey 1994):
∀e ∈ E , ∀xN ∈ F (e),
xN ∈ SNE(e)⇔ ∀i, j ∈ N, ui(xi, yi) ≥ ui(xj, yj).
It is immediate to see on simple examples that this allocation rule is likely to be empty
in many non-pathological economies. Assume for instance that for any given x, agent i
prefers agent j’s talent to her own, and conversely. Then any transfer will just increase
the envy of one of them. With Example 2 one has a less extreme illustration of this
diﬃculty.
Example 2 (pursued). When agent i has a utility function ui(x, y) = xzi + y, the
No-Envy condition applied to extended resources entails
∀i, j, xizi + yi ≥ xjzi + yj,
For instance, take i among the undeserving poor, and j among the deserving rich. One
then must have ½
xi + 1 ≥ xj + 3
3xj + 3 ≥ 3xi + 1
⇔ xj + 2 ≤ xi ≤ xj + 2/3,
which is impossible. Agent i requires a large transfer not to be envious, which renders
agent j envious.
This problem is similar to that encountered by Pazner and Schmeidler (1974) in the
model of production with unequal skills (see next section), and a line of research is to look
for nice weakenings of the No-Envy condition that reduce the non-existence problem.
Here are three examples of allocation rules derived from this idea. The first one
combines two ideas separately proposed by Feldman and Kirman (1974), who suggested
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to choose allocations with the minimal number of occurrences of envy, and by Daniel
(1975), who suggested to choose allocations where the number of agents envying any
given agent is equal to the number of agents this agent envies. For any economy e, let
B(e) be the set of such “balanced” allocations: xN ∈ B(e) if and only if xN ∈ F (e) and
for all i ∈ N ,
#{j ∈ N | uj(xi, yi) > uj(xj, yj)} = #{j ∈ N | ui(xi, yi) < ui(xj, yj)}.
and let E(e, xN) denote the number of envy occurrences in allocation xN :
E(e, xN) = #{(i, j) ∈ N2 | ui(xi, yi) < ui(xj, yj)}.
Balanced and Minimal Envy (SBME, Fleurbaey 1994):
∀e ∈ E , ∀xN ∈ F (e),
xN ∈ SBME(e)⇔ xN ∈ B(e) and ∀x0N ∈ B(e), E(e, x0N) ≥ E(e, xN).
Fleurbaey (1994) shows that a suﬃcient condition for SBME(e) to be non empty is:14
∃δ > 0,∀xN ∈ F (e),∃i ∈ N, xi > 0,
#{j ∈ N | ui(xi, yi) < ui(xj, yj)} ≤ #{j ∈ N | uj(xi, yi) ≥ uj(xj + δ, yj)}.
The second solution was proposed in a more general context by Diamantaras and
Thomson (1990). It tries to minimize the intensity of envy, this intensity being measured
for every agent by the resource needed to make this agent non-envious. An advantage of
this rule is that it is single-valued.
Minimax Envy Intensity (SMEI , Diamantaras and Thomson 1990, Fleurbaey 1994):
∀e ∈ E , ∀xN ∈ F (e),
xN ∈ SMEI(e)⇔ ∀x0N ∈ F (e), maxi∈N IEi(e, x
0
N) ≥ maxi∈N IEi(e, xN),
where IEi(e, xN) = min{δ ∈ R | ∀j ∈ N \ {i} , ui(xi + δ, yi) ≥ ui(xj, yj)}.15
The third solution makes use of all agents’ opinions about the relative well-being of two
agents. It tries to minimize the size of subsets of agents thinking that one agent is worse-
oﬀ than another agent. It takes inspiration from van Parijs’ scheme of “undominated
diversity” (van Parijs 1990), which seeks to avoid situations in which one agent is deemed
unanimously worse-oﬀ than another one, and from the family of solutions put forth by
14As shown in Fleurbaey (1994), this condition is logically weaker than the conditions given in Daniel
(1975).
15This rule is well-defined only in economies where IEi(e, xN ) is bounded from above, namely, in
economies where
∀i, j ∈ N,∃x ∈ R+, ui(x, yi) ≥ ui(Ω, yj).
Assuming min ∅ = +∞, one can extend the definition, but then the solution is not well-behaved toward
agents who are always envious.
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Iturbe and Nieto (1996), which generalizes van Parijs’ idea and seeks to avoid such a
unanimity among a subgroup of a given size and containing the worse-oﬀ agent. Let
Imi = {G ⊂ N | #G = m, i ∈ G}.
Minimal Unanimous Domination (SMUD, Fleurbaey 1994, Iturbe and Nieto 1996):
∀e ∈ E , ∀xN ∈ F (e),
xN ∈ SMUD(e)⇔ ∃m ∈ {1, ..., n},⎧
⎨
⎩
(i) ∀i, j ∈ N, ∀G ∈ Imi , ∃k ∈ G, uk(xi, yi) ≥ uk(xj, yj),
(ii) ∀p < m,∀x0N ∈ F (e), ∃i, j ∈ N,∃G ∈ Ipi ,
∀k ∈ G, uk(x0i, yi) < uk(x0j, yj).
Fleurbaey (1994) states that SMUD(e) is non empty if
∀i, j ∈ N,∃k ∈ N, uk
µ
Ω
n− 1 , yi
¶
≥ uk(0, yj),
and Iturbe and Nieto (1996) give an alternative suﬃcient condition:
∀xN ∈ F (e),∃i, k ∈ N, xi > 0,∀j ∈ N, uk(xi, yi) ≥ uk(xj, yj).
This rule makes a very indirect use of the No-Envy test, and can be viewed as aggre-
gating the opinions of the population over the transfers of resources to be made between
two given agents. Along this line another kind of allocation rule has been proposed, which
makes use of one preference relation at a time in order to look for equality of extended
resources. Aggregation of opinions can then be made in two ways. Either the preference
relation used in the computation of the allocation can be based on the profile of pref-
erences in the population, as in an Arrovian social choice problem. Or aggregation can
be made at the level of allocations, for instance by averaging the allocations obtained by
taking every agent’s preferences in turn as the reference. This suggests two diﬀerent sorts
of allocation rules. Let Φ be a mapping from
S
n≥1 Un to U .
Φ-Conditional Equality (SΦCE, Fleurbaey 1995d):
∀e ∈ E , ∀xN ∈ F (e),
xN ∈ SΦCE(e)⇔ ∀i, j ∈ N, u˜(xi, yi) = u˜(xj, yj) or
[u˜(xj , yj) > u˜(xi, yi) and xj = 0] .
where u˜ = Φ(u1, ..., un).
Notice that equality of extended resources is performed here on the basis of the max-
imin criterion, because it may be impossible to fully compensate some inequalities in
personal characteristics with the available resources. In that case some inequalities in
well-being persist and the better-oﬀ agents are left with no external resource, while only
disadvantaged agents receive positive resources (and all of them have the same well-being
according to the reference preferences).
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Average Conditional Equality (SACE, Fleurbaey 1995d):
∀e ∈ E , ∀xN ∈ F (e),
xN ∈ SACE(e)⇔ xN =
1
n
nX
k=1
xk
where
∀i, j, k ∈ N, uk(xki , yi) = uk(xkj , yj) or
£
uk(xki , yi) < uk(x
k
j , yj) and x
k
j = 0
¤
.
The Average Conditional Equality rule can be generalized by allowing the weights
between the n proposed allocations xk to diﬀer. This can be done without violating
anonymity. For instance, one could argue that allocations based on minority preferences
should be overweighted, or, on the contrary, underweighted, or that certain talents should
entail a greater weight.
By construction, these two allocation rules are non empty on the whole domain E
of economies considered here, and they are single-valued. Moreover, the Conditional
Equality rule can be immediately interpreted as derived from a social ordering function
which rationalizes it,16 and is defined as follows.
Φ-Conditional Equality (RΦCE, Roemer 1993, Bossert, Fleurbaey and Van de gaer
1999):
∀e ∈ E , ∀xN , x0N ∈ Rn+,
xNRΦCE(e)x0N ⇔ (u˜(xi, yi))i∈N ≥lex (u˜(x0i, yi))i∈N ,
where u˜ = Φ(u1, ..., un).
A rather diﬀerent approach is inspired by the Egalitarian Equivalence criterion pro-
posed by Pazner and Schmeidler (1978a), which can be easily adapted to the current
framework. The idea is to render all agents indiﬀerent between their current bundle of
extended resources (xi, yi) and a reference bundle which is the same for all. Again this
suggests two (families of) allocation rules, depending on whether some unique reference
talent y˜ is used to compute Egalitarian Equivalent allocations, or the reference y˜ varies
and the average of the resulting allocations is retained. Let Ψ be a mapping from
S
n≥1 Y
n
to Y .
Ψ-Egalitarian Equivalence (SΨEE, Pazner and Schmeidler 1978a, Fleurbaey 1995d):
∀e ∈ E , ∀xN ∈ F (e),
xN ∈ SΨEE(e)⇔ ∃x˜ ∈ R+,
∀i, j ∈ N,ui(xi, yi) = ui(x˜, y˜) or [ui(xi, yi) > ui(x˜, y˜) and xi = 0] .
16The Minimax Envy Intensity allocation rule is also rationalized by a social ordering function, defined
as follows.
Minimax Envy Intensity (RMEI)
∀e ∈ E, ∀xN , x0N ∈ IRn+,
xNRMEI(e)x0N ⇔ (−IEi(e, xN ))i∈N ≥lex (−IEi(e, x0N ))i∈N .
But this social ordering function does not satisfy the Pareto criterion, since one may have xNRMEI(e)x0N
and x0N À xN . In particular, it would no longer rationalize SMEI under a free disposal assumption.
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where y˜ = Ψ(y1, ..., yn).
Average Egalitarian Equivalence (SAEE, Moulin 1994):
∀e ∈ E , ∀xN ∈ F (e),
xN ∈ SAEE(e)⇔ xN =
1
n
nX
k=1
xk
where
∀k ∈ N, ∃x˜ ∈ R+,∀i ∈ N,
ui(xki , yi) = ui(x˜, yk) or
£
ui(xki , yi) > ui(x˜, yk) and x
k
i = 0
¤
.
These allocation rules are single-valued but may be empty over the domain E . For
convenience we will consider here the subdomain E 0 of economies with utility functions
such that
∀y ∈ Y, u(0, y) = 0
and
∀y, y0 ∈ Y, ∀x ∈ R+,∃x0 ∈ R+, u(x0, y0) ≥ u(x, y).
On this subdomain these two allocation rules are non-empty.17 The Egalitarian Equivalent
allocation rule is rationalized on E 0 by the following social ordering function. This social
ordering function applies the leximin criterion to the individual levels of resource x∗ which
would make the agents accept the reference talent y˜ instead of their current situation
(xi, yi). This gives priority to the agents with a low x∗, i.e. agents who either have a low
xi or dislike their talent yi.
Ψ-Egalitarian Equivalence (RΨEE, Pazner and Schmeidler 1978a, Bossert, Fleurbaey
and Van de gaer 1999):
∀e ∈ E 0, ∀xN , x0N ∈ Rn+,
xNRΨEE(e)x0N ⇔ (xˆ(xi, yi, ui, y˜))i∈N ≥lex (xˆ(x0i, yi, ui, y˜))i∈N
where y˜ = Ψ(y1, ..., yn), and xˆ(xi, yi, ui, y˜) is defined as the solution x∗ of
ui(xi, yi) = ui(x∗, y˜).
It is worth stressing that all these allocation rules (and social ordering functions) avoid
interpersonal comparisons of utilities. The only information they need is the profile of
preferences over (x, y) represented by uN . This can be intuitively understood as resulting
from the fact that what is sought here is equality of extended bundles (xi, yi), not of
utilities. Therefore utilities are essentially irrelevant. This idea will be made more precise
below.18
17See Fleurbaey (1995d) for an exact definition of the largest domain over which Egalitarian Equivalent
allocations exist.
18This does not imply that this theory takes sides in the philosophical debate about whether individuals
should be held responsible for their utilities and preferences (Dworkin 2000, Cohen 1989). Indeed, we
have assumed nothing about the concrete meaning of the variable y, so that y may contain any trait
related to subjective satisfaction. The concrete content of the separation between y and u (or z) has to
be decided outside the model.
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In conclusion, it seems relatively easy to define reasonable allocation rules (or social
ordering functions) for the current problem. Is it the case that all of the above solutions
are equally appealing? The axiomatic analysis of the model has shown that the answer
is no. In the next subsection, we review the main axioms proposed in the literature.
2.3 Axioms and ethical principles
Following the literature, we focus on allocation rules and all axioms presented in this
subsection bear on allocation rules defined over some domain D (either E or E 0).
A basic axiom, satisfied by all reasonable allocation rules, is that names of agents are
irrelevant.
Anonymity:
∀e = (yN , uN ,Ω) ∈ D, ∀xN ∈ S(e), ∀π ∈ ΠN ,
xπ(N) ∈ S(yπ(N), uπ(N),Ω).
A related axiom, which is implied by Anonymity when the allocation rule is single-
valued, is the following horizontal equity requirement.
Equal Treatment of Equals:
∀e ∈ D, ∀xN ∈ S(e), ∀i, j ∈ N,
[yi = yj and ui = uj]⇒ xi = xj.
The No-Envy condition can be used to define not only an allocation rule, but also an
axiom bearing on allocation rules.
No-Envy Axiom (NE):
∀e ∈ D, S(e) ⊂ SNE(e).
Since SNE(e) is empty for some e in E , this axiom cannot be satisfied. One must
therefore weaken the requirement. As explained above, this axiom embodies the principle
of compensation as well as the principle of natural reward, because it implies a substantial
degree of equality in extended bundles. The axiomatic analysis reviewed here has studied
how to weaken this axiom in the dimension of either compensation or natural reward.
Most of the axioms presented below are actually suﬃciently weak so as to express only
one of these two ethical principles.
We begin by listing axioms which express the principle of compensation, namely, the
goal of neutralizing the impact of unequal characteristics over utilities. The first axiom
is inspired by the intuitive requirement that agents with the same utility function, who
therefore diﬀer only in characteristics to be compensated, should obtain equal utility after
transfer (unless the better-oﬀ has a zero resource). Full compensation among such agents
can be obtained only when their diﬀerence in y does not entail any inequality in utility.
The fact that agents with identical utility functions are considered eliminates any problem
of separating the influence of y from the influence of u(., .) in the production of inequalities
in utility levels.
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Equal Utility for Equal Function (EUEF, Fleurbaey 1994):
∀e ∈ D, ∀xN ∈ S(e), ∀i, j ∈ N,
ui = uj ⇒ ui(xi, yi) = uj(xj, yj) or [ui(xi, yi) < uj(xj, yj) and xj = 0] .
Notice that since ui = uj, this axiom is a direct weakening of No-Envy and says that no
envy should occur among agents with identical utility functions, except when the envied
agent has a zero resource. One also sees that it is only when all agents with identical
utility function obtain the same utility level that every agent faces one and the same set
of opportunities, defining an opportunity as a pair (utility function, utility level). Any
agent who adopts a particular utility function is then assured of getting the same utility
level as the others who adopted the same function. On the other hand, recall that, as
explained in Example 2, this axiom is not totally uncontroversial and may be rejected as
displaying too much faith in the agents i and j’s own (identical but possibly idiosyncratic)
evaluation of the impact of y.
The next axiom makes the same requirement, but only when all agents have identical
utility functions, which can be interpreted as the case when all characteristics which diﬀer
among agents are to be compensated.
Equal Utility for Uniform Function (EUUF, Fleurbaey 1994, Bossert 1995):
∀e ∈ D, ∀xN ∈ S(e),
[∀i, j ∈ N, ui = uj] ⇒ ∀i, j ∈ N,
ui(xi, yi) = uj(xj, yj) or [ui(xi, yi) < uj(xj, yj) and xj = 0] .
The next axiom is even weaker, because it requires equality of utilities (or No-Envy)
only when utility functions are not only identical, but also belong to some specified subset
which may be arbitrarily small.
Equal Utility for Reference Function (EURF, Fleurbaey 1995d):
∃u˜ ∈ U ,∀e ∈ D, ∀xN ∈ S(e), if ∀i ∈ N, ui = u˜, then
∀i, j ∈ N, ui(xi, yi) = uj(xj, yj) or [ui(xi, yi) < uj(xj, yj) and xj = 0] .
The next axiom is somewhat diﬀerent and deals with changes in the profile of charac-
teristics. It says that a change in this profile should aﬀect all agents’ final utilities in the
same way. The rationale for this condition is that since those characteristics elicit com-
pensation, there is no reason to make some agents benefit while others would lose. This
may be related to Rawls’s idea ‘to regard the distribution of natural talents as a common
asset and to share in the benefits of this distribution whatever it turns out to be’ (Rawls
1971, p. 101). In the current model it makes sense to apply this solidarity requirement
only to agents who receive positive resources, because agents who do not receive resources
will have their utility level depend only on the change in their own talent, independently
of changes in the whole profile.
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Solidarity (S, Fleurbaey and Maniquet 1999):
∀e = (yN , uN ,Ω), e0 = (y0N , uN ,Ω) ∈ D, ∀xN ∈ S(e), ∀x0N ∈ S(e0),
∀i ∈ N such that x0i > 0, ui(xi, yi) ≥ ui(x0i, y0i) or
∀i ∈ N such that xi > 0, ui(xi, yi) ≤ ui(x0i, y0i).
It is easy to illustrate why these axioms express the principle of compensation and
not at all the principle of natural reward, by observing that they are all satisfied by the
following welfare egalitarian allocation rule (based on the maximin criterion applied to
utilities):
Maximin Utility (SMU):
∀e ∈ E , ∀xN ∈ F (e),
xN ∈ SMU(e)⇔ ∀x0N ∈ F (e), mini∈N ui(xi, yi) ≥ mini∈N ui(x
0
i, yi).
This allocation rule does not satisfy the principle of natural reward in any sense because
it does not seek equality of extended bundles.
We now turn to axioms reflecting the principle of natural reward, namely, the goal of
compensating only talents and not other characteristics like utility functions. The first
axiom says that an agent unanimously considered as more talented than another one
should not receive more resources.
Protection of Handicapped (PH, Fleurbaey 1994):
∀e ∈ D, ∀i, j ∈ N,
[∀x ∈ R+,∀k ∈ N, uk(x, yi) ≤ uk(x, yj)]⇒ [∀xN ∈ S(e), xi ≥ xj] .
This axiom is similar to Sen’sWeak Equity Axiom,19 and boils down to it when all utility
functions are identical. When utility functions are heterogeneous, this axiom only applies
when unanimity is obtained, which means that it is quite weak in this respect. However,
most of the axioms of a similar vein studied here are actually even weaker than it.
It is tempting to view this axiom as expressing the principle of compensation rather
than the principle of natural reward. But this would be a mistake. The protection granted
to handicapped agents is only minimal, and the allocation rule which always divides Ω
equally (xi = Ω/n for all i) does satisfy this axiom, without performing any kind of
compensation. This axiom never requires any kind of compensation, even when all agents
have identical utility functions. On the other hand, it does requires giving equal resources
to agents having identical talents y, and therefore prevents any biased transfer in favor
of some agents just because they have “good” utility functions. This is why this axiom
directly, and rather strongly, expresses the principle of natural reward.
The second, weaker axiom is, precisely, formulating the requirement that agents with
equal talents should receive the same treatment in terms of resources.
19As recalled in the introduction, this axiom says that when an individual has a lower level of utility
than another at all levels of income, the optimal allocation must not give him less income.
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Equal Resource for Equal Talent (ERET, Fleurbaey 1994):
∀e ∈ D, ∀xN ∈ S(e), ∀i, j ∈ N,
yi = yj ⇒ xi = xj.
The motivation for this requirement has been discussed in Examples 1 and 2, in the
introduction. It guarantees a neutral treatment of diﬀerent utility functions.
On the other hand, it may be criticized for failing to take account of the fact that
diﬀerent values of talent y may alter the opportunity set and then require a sensitivity of
transfers to utility functions. This criticism is illustrated in the following example.
Example 3. This example retains the main data of Examples 1 and 2, except that the
utility function is now defined as
u = x+ yz.
With this function, a greater talent y makes one more able to benefit from one’s eﬀort.
One possible policy respecting the condition formulated in the Equal Resource for Equal
Talent axiom is the following. It is based on the idea that any agent (rich or poor) who
would have z = 2 would obtain u = 8 = 6 + 2× 1 = 2 + 2× 3.
Policy AA2
y \ z 1 3
1
x = 6
u = 7
x = 6
u = 9
3
x = 2
u = 5
x = 2
u = 11
This policy, like policy A2 in Example 2, fails to compensate in one subpopulation (here,
the deserving) and overcompensates in the other (here, the undeserving). Here, one may
complain that giving the same transfer to all poor fails to take account of the fact that
by exerting eﬀort they are less able to improve their lot than the rich, and since this is
due to a low endowment in y they should not suﬀer from this. Compensation should then
take account not only of the fact that they have a lower talent, but also of the fact that
this low talent makes them less able to benefit from their own eﬀort. As a consequence,
x should depend on z as well as on y.20
In essence, this criticism is pointing at a conflict between this Equal Resource for
Equal Talent axiom and the principle of compensation (in particular the Equal Utility
for Equal Function axiom). This conflict will be formally delineated below.
20An argument along these lines is made in Tungodden (2005). A defender of natural reward may
reply that agents being responsible for their eﬀort, they cannot complain if by choosing an especially
low or high eﬀort they obtain more or less than others. This kind of defense is even more convincing
when, in an alternative interpretation, u = x+yz simply represents preferences about bundles (x, y). The
deserving poor are then just y-lovers who happen to have a low endowment in y, so that one may object
to accepting their view that this is a great handicap. See Fleurbaey (1995b, 2001), Vallentyne (2002) and
Vandenbroucke (2001) for critical discussions of natural reward, and Cappelen and Tungodden (2004a)
for an in-depth study of reward schemes.
20
A weaker requirement than Equal Resource for Equal Talent, in the natural reward
line of inspiration, is that the relative position of xi with respect to the mean resource
Ω/n should depend only on talent.
Fair Relative Resource for Equal Talent (FRRET, Sprumont 1997):
∀e ∈ D, ∀xN ∈ S(e), ∀i, j ∈ N,
yi = yj ⇒ (xi −
Ω
n
)(xj −
Ω
n
) ≥ 0.
Notice that this formulation is relatively weak since no constraint bears on xj when
xi = Ω/n.
The next axiom weakens this again by applying the requirement only to economies
with a uniform talent.
Equal Resource for Uniform Talent (ERUT, Fleurbaey 1994, Bossert 1995):
∀e ∈ D, ∀xN ∈ S(e),
∀i, j ∈ N, yi = yj ⇒ ∀i ∈ N, xi =
Ω
n
.
And a further weakening21 goes by applying this only to economies with a uniform
talent in a certain, arbitrarily small, subset.
Equal Resource for Reference Talent (ERRT, Fleurbaey 1995d):
∃y˜ ∈ Y, ∀e ∈ D, ∀xN ∈ S(e), if ∀i ∈ N, yi = y˜, then
∀i ∈ N, xi =
Ω
n
.
Another kind of condition relies on the idea that if utilities as such are not to elicit
any compensation, the allocation rule should be essentially independent of utilities.
Independence of Utilities (IU, Bossert 1995):
∀e = (yN , uN ,Ω), e0 = (yN , u0N ,Ω) ∈ D,
S(e) = S(e0).
This axiom is very strong because it forbids any use of the agents’ preferences in
the measurement of talent diﬀerentials and in determining the scale of compensation. A
weaker requirement is ordinalism, which is satisfied by all allocation rules presented in
the previous subsection.
21Another weak condition of natural reward has been proposed in Boadway et alii (2002). In the
current model, it would say that every subpopulation with a given utility function should receive its
per capita share of Ω. In other words, there should be no transfers among subpopulations of diﬀerent
utility functions. In the subdomain of economies where talents and utility functions are independently
distributed, this condition is implied by Equal Resource for Equal Talent, and (under Equal Treatment
of Equals) implies Equal Resource for Uniform Talent. It is logically independent of Fair Relative
Resource for Equal Talent. Outside this subdomain it is not reasonable (e.g. if there are more poor
among the deserving, it is acceptable to give more resources to the deserving subpopulation than its per
capita share).
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Ordinalism (O):
∀e = (yN , uN ,Ω), e0 = (yN , u0N ,Ω) ∈ D,
RN = R0N ⇒ S(e) = S(e0),
where RN (resp. R0N) is the profile of preferences represented by uN (resp. u
0
N).
Finally, we turn to another ancient notion of fairness, namely, that equal division
should be a minimum right guaranteed to every agent (Steinhaus 1948). Moulin (1991)
has shown how to extend this notion by devising lower bounds and upper bounds suitable
for division problems. In the current context of compensation, Moulin (1994) suggests to
define a bound based on what an agent would obtain if others shared his responsibility
characteristics (utility function here). Let EUUF (yN ,Ω, u) denote the allocation resulting
from the application of Equal Utility for Uniform Function (maximin of utilities) to the
economy where all agents have the same utility function u. This defines a bound that
cannot operate on all economies as a lower bound, and Moulin suggests to use it as an
upper bound when this happens.
Egalitarian Bound (EB, Moulin 1994):
∀e = (yN , uN ,Ω) ∈ D, ∀xN ∈ S(e),
∀i ∈ N, xi ≥ EUUFi(yN ,Ω, ui) or ∀i ∈ N, xi ≤ EUUFi(yN ,Ω, ui).
Although this axiom clearly has a flavor of compensation (it implies Equal Utility for
Uniform Function), one can argue that it also contains a pint of natural reward, because
it forbids excessive compensation as performed for instance by the welfare egalitarian
allocation rule SMU . In fact it also implies Equal Resource for Uniform Talent, as
indicated in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 The following table describes the logical implications between axioms (for
D = E or E 0).
Compensation Natural Reward
S O⇐ IU
⇓(1) ⇓(2)
EUEF ⇐ NE(3) ⇒ PH⇒ ERET
⇓
⇓ ⇓ FRRET
⇓
EUUF ⇐ EB ⇒ ERUT
⇓ ⇓
EURF ERRT
(1)Assuming that S satisfies Anonymity.
(2)Assuming that S satisfies Equal Treatment of Equals.
(3)Considered on the subdomain where it can be satisfied.
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Proof. We focus only on the non obvious implications.
S⇒EUEF, under Anonymity. Consider e = (yN , uN ,Ω) with ui = uj = u. Let e0 =
(y0N , uN ,Ω) be such that y0i = yj, y0j = yi, and y0k = yk for all k 6= i, j. By Anonymity, if
xN ∈ S(e), then x0N ∈ S(e0), with x0i = xj, x0j = xi, and x0k = xk for all k 6= i, j. First
case: if xi = xj = 0, then EUEF is satisfied. Second case: xi > 0 = xj. By Solidarity,
either u(xj, yj) ≥ u(x0j, y0j) or u(xi, yi) ≤ u(x0i, y0i), which is the same, and this implies
either u(xi, yi) = u(xj, yj) or [u(xi, yi) < u(xj, yj) and xj = 0] , as EUEF requires. Third
case: xixj > 0. By Solidarity, either u(xj, yj) ≥ u(x0j, y0j) and u(xi, yi) ≥ u(x0i, y0i), or
u(xj, yj) ≤ u(x0j, y0j) and u(xi, yi) ≤ u(x0i, y0i). Both mean u(xi, yi) = u(xj, yj), and EUEF
is satisfied.
NE⇒EB. Consider an allocation xN such that there exists i such that xi < EUUFi(yN ,
Ω, ui). This implies that EUUFi(yN ,Ω, ui) > 0 and therefore, for all j ∈ N,
ui(EUUFi(yN ,Ω, ui), yi) ≤ ui(EUUFj(yN ,Ω, ui), yj).
Since
P
j∈N EUUFj(yN ,Ω, ui) =
P
j∈N xj = Ω, necessarily there is j such that xj >
EUUFj(yN ,Ω, ui). This implies that ui(xi, yi) < ui(xj, yj), and thus xN is not envy-
free. As a consequence, any envy-free allocation is such that for all i ∈ N, xi ≥
EUUFi(yN ,Ω, ui). Therefore EB is satisfied in such an allocation.
The pattern of incompatibilities displayed in the next table graphically shows that
there is a tension between the principle of compensation and the principle of natural
reward. It is impossible to fully satisfy both principles at the same time.
Proposition 2 The following table describes the incompatibilities (marked by
O
) be-
tween the main axioms of compensation and natural reward (for D = E or E 0), and shows
what axioms are satisfied by the various solutions (on their respective domain).
IU ERET FRRET ERUT ERRT
S
O O O O SΨEE
(Ψ const.)
EUEF
O O O SΨEE
(Ψ idempot.)
EUUF
O SΦCE, SMUD, SACE
(Φ idempotent)
SAEE, SBME,
SMEI
EURF
SΦCE
(Φ const.)
Proof. We omit the easy proof of the incompatibility between S and ERUT, and between
EUUF and IU, and focus on the proof that EUEF and FRRET are incompatible on E 0
(and therefore on E as well). Assume the utility function is defined by u = x (yz + yˆzˆ) ,
where (z, zˆ) are preference parameters. Consider an economy with Ω = 4, and four agents,
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described in the following table:
i yi yˆi zi zˆi
1 1 2 1 2
2 1 2 2 1
3 2 1 1 2
4 2 1 2 1
FRRET requires ½
(x1 − 1)(x2 − 1) ≥ 0
(x3 − 1)(x4 − 1) ≥ 0,
and EUEF, in this particular case, simply requires½
5x1 = 4x3
4x2 = 5x4.
First possibility: x1 > 1. Then x2 ≥ 1 by FRRET and x3 > 1 by EUEF, the latter
implying x4 ≥ 1 by FRRET. All this is incompatible with x1 + x2 + x3 + x4 = 4.
Second possibility: x1 < 1. Then x2 ≤ 1 by FRRET, which implies x4 < 1 by EUEF,
implying in turn x3 ≤ 1 by FRRET. This is again impossible.
Third possibility: x1 = 1. Then x3 = 5/4 by EUEF, implying x4 ≥ 1 by FRRET. The
latter entails x2 > 1 by EUEF. And again it is impossible to have x1 + x2 + x3 + x4 = 4.
The axiom Protection of Handicapped is satisfied by SACE, by SΦCE for some Φ, and
by SMUD. The axiom Egalitarian Bound is satisfied by none of the above solutions.22
The literature provides few characterizations of allocation rules for this model. It is
first necessary to provide the definition of an ancillary axiom, capturing the idea that the
reallocation problem over a subpopulation should be correctly dealt with by the allocation
rule applied to the whole population. Consistency says that a suballocation of a selected
allocation must also be selected in the subeconomy defined by the corresponding subgroup
of agents and the total amount of money they receive in this suballocation.
Consistency (C, Thomson 1988):
∀e = (yN , uN ,Ω) ∈ D, ∀G ⊂ N, ∀xN ∈ S(e),
xG ∈ S(yG, uG,
X
i∈G
xi).
Proposition 3 (Fleurbaey 1995d, Bossert and Fleurbaey 1996) An allocation rule S de-
fined on E is single-valued and either satisfies Independence of Utilities and EqualUtility
22Here is an example of a solution satisfying Egalitarian Bound as well as Equal Utility for Equal
Function and Ordinalism. In e = (yN , uN ,Ω), it chooses some y˜ and it selects allocations xN such that:
∃x˜ ∈ R, ∀i ∈ N,
ui(xi, yi) = ui(x˜+ xˆi, y˜) or [ui(xi, yi) > ui(x˜+ xˆi, y˜) and xi = 0] .
where xˆi is defined by ui(xˆi, y˜) = ui(EUUFi(yN ,Ω, ui), yi).
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forReferenceFunction, or satisfies Consistency, EqualResource forUniformTalent and
Equal Utility for Reference Function if and only if S = SΦCE for some constant function
Φ.
Proof. Assume S satisfies IU and EURF. Take u˜ ∈ U , as posited in EURF. Consider an
economy such that for all i, ui = u˜. In this economy, EURF requires selecting the only
allocation such that
∀i, j ∈ N, u˜(xi, yi) = u˜(xj, yj) or [u˜(xi, yi) < u˜(xj, yj) and xj = 0] .
By IU, this allocation must be selected in any economy with the same profile yN , whatever
uN . Therefore S = SΦCE with Φ(uN) ≡ u˜.
Now, one easily checks that C and ERUT imply IU for a single-valued allocation rule.
Hence the second result.23
Proposition 4 (Fleurbaey 1995d) An allocation rule S defined on E 0 is single-valued
and satisfies Consistency, Equal Resource for Reference Talent and Equal Utility for
Uniform Function if and only if S = SΨEE for some constant function Ψ.
Proof. On E 0, Egalitarian Equivalent allocations are such that for all i, ui(xi, yi) =
ui(x˜, y˜), with x˜ > 0 whenever Ω > 0. Assume S satisfies C, ERRT and EUUF. Take some
y˜ ∈ Y, as posited in ERRT, and some e = (yN , uN ,Ω) ∈ E 0. Let xN be an Egalitarian
Equivalent allocation in e, such that ui(xi, yi) = ui(x˜, y˜) for all i. Construct the 2n-agent
economy e0 = ((yN , y˜, ..., y˜), (uN , uN),Ω + nx˜). By C and EUUF, one must have for all
i ≤ n, ui(Si(e0), yi) = ui(Si+n(e0), y˜). By C and ERRT, one must have for all i, j > n,
Si(e0) = Sj(e0). These two conditions imply that for all i > n, Si(e0) = x˜, and that for all
i ≤ n, ui(Si(e0), yi) = ui(x˜, y˜). By C, therefore, S(e) = xN . This implies that S = SΨEE
with Ψ(yN) ≡ y˜.
A noticeable feature of these results is that the characterized allocation rules satisfy
Ordinalism while the axioms Equal Resource for Uniform Talent and Equal Resource
for Reference Talent do not by themselves imply it. It is an interesting feature of this
literature that it gives an ethical justification to ordinalism, in addition to the traditional
positivist justification underlying New Welfare Economics.24
There is no axiomatic study of social ordering functions for this model, with the
exception of Maniquet (2004), who studies some weak axioms of compensation and natural
reward and their consequences about how to measure individual welfare. For instance,
the Φ-Conditional Equality ordering function RΦCE defined above relies on the leximin
23Fleurbaey (1995d) also characterizes SACE on the basis of EUUF and an axiom expressing that
the allocation rule aggregates opinions about the individual talents. The result in Fleurbaey (1995d) is
actually incorrect as stated, because under the guise of Anonymity the proof makes an implicit use of a
third axiom saying that permutations of preferences only do not aﬀect the selected allocation. This third
axiom is independent of the others.
24In a similar analysis focused on social ordering functions, Maniquet (2004) shows how natural reward
axioms entail ordinalism, under a consistency requirement.
25
criterion applied to individual indices measured by u˜(xi, yi). Maniquet shows that, when
combined with a consistency property, compensation and natural reward requirements
imply that the social ordering function has the structure of a classical “welfarist” criterion
applied to vectors of individual indices of well-being.
2.4 The quasi-linear case
The case when utility functions are quasi-linear is particularly simple and has been the
topic of many papers.25 It is assumed that utility functions are as follows:
ui(xi, yi) = xi + vi(yi).
As usual in the quasi-linear case, negative quantities of consumption x are allowed, and
for simplification the total amount to be distributed is Ω = 0. The quasi-linear case
is particularly relevant to applications where ui measures a monetary outcome. This
version of the model is due to Bossert (1995), who described vi(yi) as individual pre-
tax income, xi as an income transfer, and ui(xi, yi) as final income. This model is also
relevant to other applications, for instance when agents are administrative units (local
administrations, local branches of a national organization, etc.) and vi(yi) is their initial
budget balance, to be corrected by transfers xi between units. See Subsection 4.7 for
examples of applications.
Bossert (1995), and the subsequent literature, actually adopted a parameterized de-
scription of the utility functions:
ui(xi, yi) = xi + v(yi, zi).
This formulation is mathematically convenient, and also graphical in order to understand
that the ethical goal is to neutralize inequalities due to y (principle of compensation) and
to preserve inequalities due to z (principle of natural reward). We retain it in the sequel.
It is then convenient to describe an economy by the pair of profiles e = (yN , zN).
The domain of definition of allocation rules studied here is the set of economies with
n ≥ 2, yN ∈ Y n, zN ∈ Zn, where Y and Z are subsets of euclidean spaces, and v is a
mapping from Y × Z to R. Let Eql denote this domain, EYql the same domain when Y
is an interval of R and v is continuous and increasing in y, and EZql the same domain
when Z is an interval of R and v is continuous and increasing in z. Let EY Zcql denote the
subdomain of EYql ∩EZql such that y and z are complementary, i.e. such that v(y, z)−v(y0, z)
is non-decreasing in z for any given y > y0.26
The quasi-linear case provides a simpler framework for the formulation of many axioms
and solutions. It also sheds more light on the trade-oﬀ between compensation and natural
25See Bossert (1995), Bossert and Fleurbaey (1996), Bossert, Fleurbaey and Van de gaer (1999), Cap-
pelen and Tungodden (2002, 2003b), Iturbe (1997), Moulin (1994), Sprumont (1997) and Tungodden
(2005).
26This assumption corresponds to the idea that the productivity of talent increases with eﬀort, or
equivalently that the productivity of eﬀort increases with talent.
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reward, and in particular reveals that the root of the problem, in this case, is the non-
separability of v in y and z. When v is additively separable in y and z, then all the main
solutions coincide and the tension between compensation and natural reward disappears.
This is explained below.
2.4.1 Allocation rules
There are a few facts and notions specific to this particular domain.
First, the subdomain in which the No-Envy allocation rule is non empty now has a
precise definition.
Proposition 5 (Svensson 1983) For all e ∈ Eql, SNE(e) is non empty if and only if
∀π ∈ ΠN ,
X
i∈N
v(yi, zi) ≥
X
i∈N
v(yπ(i), zi).
Second, the definitions of the allocation rules can be simplified because zero is no
longer a lower bound to resources. We only provide here a sample of these more explicit
definitions.
Φ-Conditional Equality (SΦCE):
∀e ∈ Eql,
(SΦCE)i (e) = −v(yi, z˜) +
1
n
nX
j=1
v(yj, z˜).
where z˜ = Φ(z1, ..., zn).
Ψ-Egalitarian Equivalent (SΨEE):
∀e ∈ Eql,
(SΨEE)i (e) = −v(yi, zi) + v(y˜, zi) +
1
n
nX
j=1
(v(yj, zj)− v(y˜, zj)) .
where y˜ = Ψ(y1, ..., yn).
Third, new allocation rules can be defined. The next one is similar to SΨEE in that
it refers to a benchmark level of pre-transfer utility, v(y˜, zi), but instead of giving this
level of utility to agent i plus an increment, it applies a proportional adjustment so as to
meet the resource constraint. Notice that the idea of egalitarian-equivalence is lost in this
operation.
Ψ-Proportionally Adjusted Equivalent (SΨPAE, Iturbe 1997):
∀e ∈ Eql,
(SΨPAE)i (e) = −v(yi, zi) +
Pn
j=1 v(yj, zj)Pn
j=1 v(y˜, zj)
v(y˜, zi),
where y˜ = Ψ(y1, ..., yn).
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Bossert (1995) proposes an average version of this allocation rule. The Average Pro-
portionally Adjusted Equivalent (SAPAE) allocation rule is constructed by computing the
average of SΨPAE allocations with y˜ = yj for every j, successively.
Finally, when the variable y or z is one-dimensional, it is possible to define the following
allocation rules.
Balanced Egalitarian (SBE, Sprumont 1997):
∀e ∈ EYql ,
(SBE)i (e) = −v(yi, zi) + v(yˆ, zi),
where yˆ is defined as the solution to
nX
j=1
v(yj, zj) =
nX
j=1
v(yˆ, zj).
Notice that this solution would belong to the family of SΨEE if the function Ψ could
have (yN , zN) as its argument. The next solution is dual to this one, and similarly, it
would belong to the family of SΦCE if the function Φ could have (yN , zN) as its argument.
Balanced Conditionally Egalitarian (SBCE, Sprumont 1997):
∀e ∈ EZql ,
(SBE)i (e) = −v(yi, zˆ) +
1
n
nX
j=1
v(yj, zj),
where zˆ is defined as the solution to
nX
j=1
v(yj, zj) =
nX
j=1
v(yj, zˆ).
Cappelen and Tungodden (2002, 2003b) propose an allocation rule which splits the
proceeds among agents with similar values of z. First rank the agents in such a way that
z1 ≤ ... ≤ zn. The first agent then receives an equal split of the total v which would be
obtained if all agents had the same z1. The second agent also receives this plus an equal
split of the additional v which would be obtained if all agents i = 2, ..., n had the same
z2. And so on.
Serially Egalitarian (SSE, Cappelen and Tungodden 2002):27
∀e ∈ EZql ,
(SBE)i (e) = −v(yi, zi) +
1
n
nX
j=1
v(yj, z1) +
iX
j=2
1
n− j + 1
nX
k=j
[v(yk, zj)− v(yk, zj−1)] .
All of these allocation rules are based on complex computations of v(y, z) for combi-
nations of characteristics which are not necessarily observed in the population. One can
27Cappelen and Tungodden (2003b) also introduce the symmetric rule which starts from zn. There is
also a dual to SSE , which they do not consider, and which taxes agents in proportion to the v that would
be obtained if individuals adopted y1 ≤ ... ≤ yi in sequence.
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define adapted versions of some of these allocation rules so as to rely only on the observed
vi = v(yi, zi). Define the sets Ny = {i ∈ N | yi = y} and Nz = {i ∈ N | zi = z}.
Observable Average Conditional Egalitarian (SOACE, Bossert, Fleurbaey and Van
de gaer 1999):
∀e ∈ Eql,
(SOACE)i (e) = −
1
#Nyi
X
j∈Nyi
vj +
1
n
nX
j=1
vj.
Observable Average Egalitarian Equivalent (SOAEE, Bossert, Fleurbaey and Van
de gaer 1999):
∀e ∈ Eql,
(SOAEE)i (e) = −vi +
1
#Nzi
X
j∈Nzi
vj.
2.4.2 Axioms
The definitions of some of the axioms can be simplified since zero is no longer a lower
bound to resources. Moreover, quasi-linearity entails a property which is not generally
true in the previous model (it served to define E 0 in the previous subsection):
∀y, y0 ∈ Y, ∀u ∈ U,∀x ∈ R,∃x0 ∈ R, u(x0, y0) ≥ u(x, y),
and these two features guarantee that full equality of utilities is always possible. This
simplifies the axioms of compensation. For instance, Equal Utility for Equal Function
now reads as follows:
Equal Utility for Equal Function (EUEF):
∀e ∈ Eql, ∀xN ∈ S(e), ∀i, j ∈ N,
zi = zj ⇒ xi + v(yi, zi) = xj + v(yj, zj).
A similar simplification applies to Equal Utility for Uniform Function and Equal
Utility for Reference Function. The Solidarity axiom is also simplified somewhat.
Solidarity (S):
∀e = (yN , zN), e0 = (y0N , zN) ∈ Eql, ∀xN ∈ S(e), ∀x0N ∈ S(e0),
∀i ∈ N, xi + v(yi, zi) ≥ x0i + v(y0i, zi) or
∀i ∈ N, xi + v(yi, zi) ≤ x0i + v(y0i, zi).
The literature has also introduced new, specific axioms. One of these, which is the
dual counterpart of Fair Relative Resource for Equal Talent, refers to the mean utility
defined as: v¯(e) = (1/n)
P
i∈N v(yi, zi), and requires that two agents with the same utility
function should be similarly ranked with respect to the mean utility.
Fair Ranking for Equal Function (FREF, Sprumont 1997):
∀e ∈ Eql, ∀xN ∈ S(e), ∀i, j ∈ N,
zi = zj ⇒ (xi + v(yi, zi)− v¯(e)) (xj + v(yj, zj)− v¯(e)) ≥ 0.
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The next axiom is a strengthening of Solidarity, based on the argument that there is no
reason to make some agents benefit unequally from variations in the profile, in particular,
it would be undesirable to let an agent whose characteristics are improved to benefit more
than other agents.
Additive Solidarity (AS, Bossert 1995):28
∀e = (yN , zN), e0 = (y0N , zN) ∈ Eql, ∀xN ∈ S(e), ∀x0N ∈ S(e0),
∀i, j ∈ N, xi + v(yi, zi)− (x0i + v(y0i, zi)) = xj + v(yj, zj)− (x0j + v(y0j, zj)).
At the opposite, a weaker version of the Solidarity axiom applies only when mean
utility is unchanged.
Weak Solidarity (WS, Iturbe 1997):
∀e = (yN , zN), e0 = (y0N , zN) ∈ Eql, ∀xN ∈ S(e), ∀x0N ∈ S(e0),
v¯(e) = v¯(e0)⇒ ∀i ∈ N, xi + v(yi, zi) = x0i + v(y0i, zi).
Another kind of solidarity requires proportional moves of the agents’ final utilities:
Multiplicative Solidarity (MS, Iturbe 1997):
∀e = (yN , zN), e0 = (y0N , zN) ∈ Eql, ∀xN ∈ S(e), ∀x0N ∈ S(e0),
∀i, j ∈ N, [xi + v(yi, zi)]
£
x0j + v(y
0
j, zj)
¤
= [x0i + v(y
0
i, zi)] [xj + v(yj, zj)] .29
The axioms of natural reward defined in the previous model do not need any adaptation
here. Notice that Ordinalism is built in the model since we make use only of the quasi-
linear representation of the quasi-linear preferences.
The axiom of Egalitarian Bound can be given a more explicit definition.
Egalitarian Bound (EB):
∀e = (yN , zN) ∈ Eql, ∀xN ∈ S(e),
∀i ∈ N, xi ≥ EUUFi(yN , zi) or ∀i ∈ N, xi ≤ EUUFi(yN , zi),
where
EUUFi(yN , zi) = −v(yi, zi) +
1
n
nX
j=1
v(yj, zi).
We now study the modified relationships between the axioms. One sees that the
quasi-linear case displays a fuller duality between the axioms and solutions related to the
principles of compensation on the one hand, natural reward on the other hand.
28An equivalent formulation of this axiom, adopted by Bossert (1995), refers to the change of only one
agent’s characteristics.
29When this product is diﬀerent from zero, one then obtains that the agents’ utilities change in the
same proportion:
xi + v(yi, zi)
x0i + v(y
0
i, zi)
=
xj + v(yj , zj)
x0j + v(y
0
j , zj)
.
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Proposition 6 The following table describes the logical implications between the axioms.
Compensation Natural Reward
AS⇒S⇐MS IU
⇓
WS ⇓(2)
⇓(1)
EUEF ⇐ NE(3) ⇒ PH⇒ ERET
⇓ ⇓
FREF ⇓ FRRET
⇓ ⇓
EUUF ⇐ EB ⇒ ERUT
⇓ ⇓
EURF ERRT
(1)Assuming that S satisfies Anonymity.
(2)Assuming that S satisfies Equal Treatment of Equals.
(3)Considered on the subdomain where it can be satisfied.
The proof is similar to that of Prop. 1.30
Proposition 7 The following table describes the incompatibilities (marked by
O
) be-
tween the main axioms of compensation and natural reward, and shows what axioms are
satisfied by the various solutions. The pairs of axioms AS and ERUT, EUEF and ERET,
30Notice that a weak version of Independence of Utilities, limited to changes of zN which do not change
v¯(e), could play a dual role toWeak Solidarity in the table.
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EUUF and IU are compatible if and only if v is additively separable in y and z.31
IU ERET FRRET ERUT ERRT
AS
O O O O SΨEE
(Ψconst.)
MS
O O O O SΨPAE
(Ψconst.)
S,WS
O O O
(SBE onEYql)
O
EUEF
O O O SAEE, SAPAE
SOAEE, SSE
SΨEE(Ψidemp.)
FREF
O O
(SBCE on EZql)
O
EUUF
O SACE, SOACE
SMUD, SΦCE
(Φidempotent)
EURF
SΦCE
(Φconst.)
Proof. If v is not additively separable, there exist y, y0, z, z0 such that
v(y0, z)− v(y, z) 6= v(y0, z0)− v(y, z0).
These values will be used in various examples below.
AS and ERUT are incompatible if v is not additively separable. Consider an economy
e with two agents 1 and 2 with profile, respectively, (y, z), (y, z0). By ERUT, one must have
x1 = x2 = 0. Consider another economy e0 with two agents and a new profile (y0, z), (y0, z0).
By ERUT again, one must have x01 = x02 = 0. And by AS, one must have
x01 + v(y
0, z)− x1 − v(y, z) = x02 + v(y0, z0)− x2 − v(y, z0),
which is impossible.
EUUF and IU are incompatible if v is not additively separable. Consider an economy
e with two agents 1 and 2 with profile, respectively, (y, z), (y0, z). By EUUF, one must
have x1+ v(y, z) = x2+ v(y0, z). Consider another economy e0 with two agents and a new
profile (y, z0), (y0, z0). By EUUF again, one must have x01 + v(y, z0) = x02 + v(y0, z0). And
by IU, one must have x01 = x1 and x02 = x2,which is impossible.
EUEF and ERET are incompatible if v is not additively separable. Consider an
economy with four agents 1 through 4 with profile, respectively, (y, z), (y, z0), (y0, z) and
(y0, z0). By EUEF, one must have
x1 + v(y, z) = x3 + v(y0, z),
x2 + v(y, z0) = x4 + v(y0, z0).
31See also Cappelen and Tungodden (2004b) for another perspective on the conflict between compen-
sation and natural reward.
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By ERET, one must have x1 = x2 and x3 = x4. This is again impossible.
FREF and FRRET are incompatible (unlike the previous pairs of axioms, they may
be compatible in some cases of non-separable v). Take an economy with four agents, a
function v((y, yˆ), (z, zˆ)) = yz + yˆ.zˆ. The profile of the parameters y, yˆ, z, zˆ is as in the
proof of Prop. 2. One computes v¯(e) = 4.5. FREF then requires½
(x1 + 0.5)(x3 − 0.5) ≥ 0
(x2 − 0.5)(x4 + 0.5) ≥ 0,
while FRRET requires ½
x1x2 ≥ 0
x3x4 ≥ 0.
Try x1 ≥ 0. This implies x3 ≥ 0.5, and x4 ≥ 0 (from x3x4 ≥ 0), and therefore x2 ≥ 0.5.
This makes it impossible to achieve x1 + x2 + x3 + x4 = 0.
Try x1 < 0. This implies x2 ≤ 0, and therefore x4 ≤ −0.5, and therefore x3 ≤ 0. Same
contradiction.
In the domain Eql, the axiom Egalitarian Bound is now satisfied by SAEE.
Characterizations specific to this model have been provided. In Bossert and Fleur-
baey (1996) it is shown that SACE is the only single-valued anonymous allocation rule
defined on Eql and satisfying Equal Resource for Equal Talent, Equal Utility for Uniform
Function and an additional axiom stipulating that, when one agent k’s characteristic zk
changes, the change in xi registered by any i should not depend on the value of zj for
j 6= i, k. One motivation for such an axiom, which is logically weaker than Independence
of Utilities, is that resource transfers for any agent should not be sensitive to how this
agent’s characteristic z is compared to the rest of the population. Similarly, SAEE is the
only single-valued anonymous allocation rule defined on Eql and satisfying Equal Resource
for Uniform Talent, Equal Utility for Equal Function and an additional axiom in the
vein of Solidarity (and implied by it), stipulating that, when one agent k’s characteristic
yk changes, the change in ui registered by any i should not depend on the value of yj for
j 6= i, k.
It is also easy to check that an allocation rule satisfies Additive Solidarity (resp.
Multiplicative Solidarity) and Equal Resource for Reference Talent if and only if it is a
SΨEE (resp. SΨPAE) with a constant Ψ (Bossert and Fleurbaey 1996, resp. Iturbe 1997),
and that SBE is the only allocation rule defined on EYql and satisfying Weak Solidarity
and Equal Resource for Uniform Talent (Iturbe 1997).
Bossert (1995) characterizes SAPAE as the only allocation rule satisfyingEqualResource
for Uniform Talent and an axiom saying that, when one agent k’s characteristic yk
changes to y0k, the change in ui registered by any i should be equal to the diﬀerence
v(y0k, zi)− v(yk, zi), up to a multiplicative term depending on the profile and incorporat-
ing the feasibility constraint. The diﬀerence v(y0k, zi)− v(yk, zi) represents the change in
pre-tax income which would be obtained by i if this agent was submitted to the same
change of characteristic as agent k. This axiom is logically stronger than Equal Utility
for Uniform Function and may be viewed as expressing an idea of solidarity, although it
is not compatible withWeak Solidarity.
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Characterizations of SOACE and SOAEE are provided in Bossert, Fleurbaey and Van
de gaer (1999).
In a model with a continuum of agents, Sprumont (1997) characterizes SBE as the
only single-valued allocation rule defined on a domain similar to EYql and satisfying Equal
Utility for Equal Function and Fair Relative Resource for Equal Talent, and he dually
characterizes SBCE as the only single-valued allocation rule defined on a domain like EZql
and satisfying Equal Resource for Equal Talent and Fair Ranking for Equal Function.
Tungodden (2005) and Cappelen and Tungodden (2002, 2003b) study weak variants
of Independence of Utilities, focusing on the issue of how other agents may be aﬀected
when an agent j changes his zj. One variant says that Independence of Utilities applies
only when the agent j changing zj has yj = ey. Combined with Equal Utility for Equal
Function, this immediately characterizes SΨEE with Ψ ≡ ey on a subdomain with fixed yN
(see Tungodden 2005 and Cappelen and Tungodden 2003b). Another variant says that
when an agent j changes zj, all other agents i have their transfer xi changed by the same
amount (so that their diﬀerential outcomes do not change). This can be justified as an
application of a solidarity principle, the other agents not being responsible for the change
in zj.32 Yet another variant says that when zj increases, then xi does not decrease for
any i 6= j, the idea being that an increase in eﬀort should not hurt others. Among the
SΨEE allocation rules, and on the domain EY Zcql , this axiom is satisfied only by SΨEE with
Ψ(yN) = mini yi, and Cappelen and Tungodden (2002) characterize it with this axiom,
the previous one, Equal Utility for Equal Function and an ancillary condition restricting
the outcome gap between any pair of agents to lie between the maximal and minimal
productivity.33 They also characterize SΨEE with Ψ(yN) = maxi yi with the symmetric
axiom saying that when zj increases, then xi does not increase for any i 6= j. Finally,
on the domain EY Zcql they characterize the serial rule SSE with Equal Utility for Equal
Function and an axiom saying that an increase in an agent’s zj does not aﬀect the agents
with zi ≤ zj. Interestingly, these various axioms are all logically weaker than Independence
of Utilities, so that they are satisfied by SΦCE for constant Φ, but turn out to be also
compatible with a high degree of compensation, as shown in the quoted results.
If v is additively separable so that v(y, z) = v1(y)+v2(z), then Independence ofUtilities
and Additive Solidarity (and all weaker axioms) are compatible. They are satisfied by
32With this axiom andEqualUtility for Equal Function, Cappelen and Tungodden (2004a) characterize
a generalized version of egalitarian-equivalence, on a subdomain of EZql with fixed yN :
(SGEE)i (e) = −v(yi, zi) + r(zi) +
1
n
nX
j=1
(v(yj , zj)− r(zj)) ,
where r : Z → R is an arbitrary function.
33This condition is: if zi > zj , then
v(min y, zi)− v(min y, zj) ≤ Si(e) + v(yi, zi)− Sj(e)− v(yj , zj) ≤ v(max y, zi)− v(max y, zj).
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the “canonical” allocation rule defined by
xi = −v1(yi) +
1
n
nX
j=1
v1(yj),
which then coincides with SΦCE, SACE, SΨEE, SAEE, SAPAE, SBE, and SBCE.34 Notice
that the characterizations mentioned in this subsection and the previous one are still valid
in this particular context of additive separability.
3 Unequal productive skills
The second environment where properties of compensation and responsibility have been
studied is the production environment.35 It is defined with respect to a group of agents
sharing a technology transforming one input (typically their labor) into one output.
Agents may diﬀer by their production skill and by their preferences towards labor-time-
consumption bundles.36
The common ethical premiss of the literature surveyed in this section is that the
principle of compensation applies to skills (e.g. skills are due to innate or inherited physical
or intellectual abilities), whereas preferences are under the agents’ responsibility.37 In
addition, it is also considered that diﬀerent preferences do not justify any diﬀerential
treatment, which is in line with the principle of natural reward.
We begin by defining the production model. Then, we define the basic compensation
and natural reward axioms. As in the pure distribution problem studied above, incompat-
ibilities between axioms reflecting the two principles arise. The remaining of the section is
devoted to analyzing several ways out of these negative results. Compared to the previous
section, substantially diﬀerent concepts and results are presented, due to the particular
structure of the production problem.
34It coincides with SΨPAE for
Ψ(y1, ..., yn) = v−11
Ã
1
n
nX
i=1
v1(yi)
!
.
35This model has been introduced by Mirrlees (1971) and Pazner and Schmeidler (1974). The problem
of compensation as such has been studied in this model by Bossert, Fleurbaey and Van de gaer (1999),
Fleurbaey and Maniquet (1996a, 1998, 1999, 2001, 2002, 2005), Gaspart (1996, 1998), Kolm (1996a,
2004a,b), and Maniquet (1998).
36In a similar model, Moulin and Roemer (1989) study the very diﬀerent problem of sharing a technology
without compensation for any individual characteristic (self-ownership), but their result is akin to results
in Fleurbaey and Maniquet (1999) because one of their axiom actually implies some compensation (see
Fleurbaey and Maniquet (1999) for details).
37Contrary to the previous model which was more abstract, this model is unambiguously in line with
Rawls’ and Dworkin’s view that individuals should assume responsibility for their preferences, even when
such preferences are not under their control.
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3.1 The model
There are two goods, an input contribution (labor time) c and a consumption good c.
An economy is a list e = (sN , uN , f), where N = {1, ..., n} is a finite population, si
denotes agent i’s production skill, ui denotes agent i’s utility function defined on bundles
x = (c, c), and f : R+ →R+ is a one-input-one-output production function yielding a
total production equal to f
¡P
i∈N sici
¢
. The agents’ consumption set is X = [0, c]×R+,
where c is the maximal labor time which an agent can provide.
The relevant domain, denoted E , consists of economies e = (sN , uN , f) such that
n ≥ 2; for all i ∈ N, si ≥ 0, and ui is a continuous and quasi-concave function on X,
non-increasing in c and increasing in c; f is increasing and concave. Let U denote the set
of utility functions satisfying the above conditions.
In an economy e = (sN , uN , f) ∈ E , an allocation is a vector of bundles xN =
(x1, ..., xn) ∈ Xn. It is feasible for e if and only if
X
i∈N
ci ≤ f
ÃX
i∈N
sici
!
.
We denote by F (e) the set of feasible allocations for e ∈ E , and by Fi(e) the projection
of F (e) on agent i’s consumption set, for every i ∈ N . The literature has concentrated
initially on allocation rules. As in the model studied in the previous section, however, most
allocation rules obtained here can be rationalized by social ordering functions. Moreover,
axioms directly bearing on social ordering functions have also been proposed, in the
special case where the production function is linear. Let EL ⊂ E denote the subdomain of
economies such that f(q) = q for all q ∈ R+ (since skills sN can always be renormalized
this covers the more general case of linear production functions).
An allocation rule is a correspondence S which associates to every e ∈ E a non-empty
subset of its feasible allocations S(e) ⊂ F (e). A social ordering function is a mapping
R associating every e ∈ EL with a complete ordering R(e) over the set of allocations Xn
(and P (e), resp. I(e), denotes the related strict preference, resp. indiﬀerence, relation).
At this point, we may introduce some basic requirements which will be used repeatedly
in the sequel. First, we have the usual (strong) Pareto eﬃciency requirement.
Pareto-Eﬃciency (PE):
∀e = (sN , uN , f) ∈ E , ∀xN ∈ S(e), ∀x0N ∈ F (e)
[∀i ∈ N, ui(x0i) ≥ ui (xi)]⇒ [∀i ∈ N, ui(x0i) = ui (xi)].
For all e ∈ E , let PE(e) denote the set of Pareto-eﬃcient allocations for e. Let us define
the budget set B(s, w, x) ⊂ X by
B(s, w, (c, c)) = {(c0, c0) ∈ X | c0 − wsc0 ≤ c− wsc}.
This is the budget of an agent with skill s, who is just able to get bundle x = (c, c) when
w is the relative price of eﬃcient labor. We will say that w is a supporting price for a
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Pareto-eﬃcient allocation xN ∈ PE(e) when:½
∀i ∈ N, xi ∈ argmaxx∈B(si,w,xi) ui(x),¡P
i∈N ci,
P
i∈N sici
¢
∈ argmax(Y,L):Y≤f(L) Y − wL.
Let W (xN) denote the set of supporting prices for xN .
A second basic requirement is that the replica of a selected allocation be a selected
allocation for the replicated economy.
Replication Invariance:
∀e = (sN , uN , f) ∈ E , ∀xN ∈ S(e), ∀ν positive integer,
νxN ∈ S(νsN , νuN , fν),
where νxN means that xN is replicated ν times (and similarly for νsN and νuN), and
fν ∈ F is defined by f ν(q) = νf ¡ qν ¢.
Third, we retain the simple horizontal equity requirement that two identical agents
always reach the same welfare level.
Equal Treatment of Equals:
∀e = (sN , uN , f) ∈ E , ∀xN ∈ S(e), ∀i, j ∈ N ,
[si = sj and ui = uj]⇒ [ui(xi) = uj(xj)].
Fourth, there is the requirement that a selected allocation remains selected after a
contraction in the production set which leaves this allocation feasible.
Contraction Independence (CI, Moulin 1990):
∀e = (sN , uN , f), e0 = (sN , uN , g) ∈ E , ∀xN ∈ S(e),
[∀ q ∈ R+, g(q) ≤ f(q) and xN ∈ F (e0)]⇒ [xN ∈ S(e0)].
Finally, we have the requirement that if an allocation is selected, then all the allocations
which are Pareto-indiﬀerent to this allocation are also selected.
No Discrimination (ND, Thomson 1983):
∀e = (sN , uN , f) ∈ E , ∀xN ∈ S(e), ∀x0N ∈ F (e),
[∀i ∈ N, ui(x0i) = ui(xi)]⇒ [x0N ∈ S(e)].
Like most of the literature on fair allocation, the literature reviewed here has focused on
a restricted informational basis with ordinal non-comparable preferences. As in Section 2,
we depart from it and retain utility functions here, in order to make it more transparent
that this informational limitation is not arbitrary and is a consequence of the ethical
requirements posited in this context, in particular those pertaining to the natural reward
principle. All allocation rules presented below do satisfy the Ordinalism axiom (defined
similarly as in Section 2).
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3.2 Fairness in compensation and reward
In the model just defined, the skill parameter, for which agents should be compensated,
is not an argument of preferences. But this is actually not a fundamental diﬀerence
with the model of the previous section. Indeed, the current model may equivalently be
written in terms of eﬃcient labor cˆi = sici. The feasibility constraint is then simplyP
i∈N ci ≤ f
³P
i∈N cˆi
´
. More importantly, individual utility is then computed as
ui(ci, ci) = ui(cˆi/si, ci),
where one sees that the parameter si does enter the utility function. The most relevant
diﬀerences between the current model and the previous one are, actually, the following.
First, the parameter si enters preferences in a special way (as a denominator to cˆi), and
in particular, the fact that si is a real number, and that utility is always non-decreasing
in it (in the domain E), excludes any disagreement problem about how to rank indi-
vidual talents. Second, transferable resources (cˆi, ci) are two-dimensional, which entails
that Pareto-eﬃciency is no longer trivially satisfied. Third, resources can be transformed
by production. The presence of production gives this model a particular structure with
specific moral issues. For instance, several notions described in this section are based on
the idea that consumption should be somehow proportional to labor, or minimally, that
nobody should work for nothing.38
As a guide to the definition of proper conditions reflecting the principles of compen-
sation and of natural reward, it is then convenient to apply the No-Envy condition to
extended bundles (cˆi, ci, si). This yields:
∀i, j ∈ N, ui(cˆi/si, ci) ≥ ui(cˆj/sj, cj).
Since ui(cˆj/sj, cj) = ui(cj, cj), one obtains the ordinary No-Envy condition as it was
applied by Pazner and Schmeidler (1974) in this context:
No-Envy (NE):
∀e = (sN , uN , f) ∈ E , ∀xN ∈ S(e), ∀i, j ∈ N , ui(xi) ≥ ui (xj).
Pazner and Schmeidler (1974) showed that in some economies of the domain E , there
does not exist any Pareto-eﬃcient allocation satisfying the No-Envy condition. In other
words, no allocation rule S satisfies the above No-Envy axiom and the Pareto-Eﬃciency
axiom.39 Again, it appears that this negative result is just a consequence of the tension
between the principle of compensation and the principle of natural reward, which are both
embodied in the No-Envy condition.
First, let us list basic axioms which weaken the No-Envy requirement and focus on
only one of the two conflicting principles. In line with the compensation principle, one
38Another diﬀerence with the model of Section 2 is that one resource (cˆi) is a bad. Besides, the
consumption range for eﬃcient labor diﬀers between agents: [0, sic¯]. This reduces the transferability of cˆ.
39In contrast with the model of the previous section, the No-Envy axiom is not empty. This is due to
the fact that si enters the utility function ui(cˆi/si, yi) in a special way. For instance, No-Envy is satisfied
by giving the bundle (c, c) = (0, 0) to all agents.
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would like to compensate for diﬀerences in skills, so that two agents having the same
utility functions reach the same welfare level. The axioms of Equal Utility for Equal
Function, Equal Utility for Uniform Function and Equal Utility for Reference Function
can be immediately adapted from the previous setting. We present one of them, in order
to avoid any ambiguity.
Equal Utility for Equal Function (EUEF):40
∀e = (sN , uN , f) ∈ E , ∀xN ∈ S(e), ∀i, j ∈ N ,
[ui = uj]⇒ [ui(xi) = uj(xj)].
Since external resources are multi-dimensional in this model, the natural reward prin-
ciple can no longer be formulated in terms of a simple equality of resources between
equally talented agents. But the No-Envy condition does express an idea of equality
of multi-dimensional resources.41 Therefore, weakening No-Envy by applying it only to
equally skilled agents seems a good way of adapting the natural reward principle to the
current setting.
No-Envy among Equally Skilled (NEES, Fleurbaey and Maniquet 1996a):
∀ e = (sN , uN , f) ∈ E , ∀xN ∈ S(e), ∀i, j ∈ N ,
[si = sj]⇒ [ui(xi) ≥ ui(xj)].
In the same vein, one can then define an axiom of No-Envy among Uniformly Skilled
(NEUS).
Interestingly, however, there is a problem with defining an axiom based on some ar-
bitrary reference skill. For any economy with a uniform strictly positive skill s, indeed,
it is possible to rescale the production function in such a way that the set of feasible
bundles is the same as in another economy with any other uniform skill s0.42 Presumably,
40Working only with ordinal non comparable preferences, Fleurbaey and Maniquet (1996a, 1999) ac-
tually used the following axiom, which says that agents with identical preferences should have bundles
on the same indiﬀerence curve (Ri denotes agent i’s preference relation, Ii denotes indiﬀerence):
Equal Welfare for Equal Preferences:
∀e ∈ E, ∀xN ∈ S(e), ∀i, j ∈ N ,
[Ri = Rj ]⇒ [xi Ii xj ].
The “Equal Welfare” label is a little misleading since it suggests that interpersonal comparisons of utilities
are smuggled in the analysis. Actually, this axiom is a direct consequence of Equal Utility for Equal
Function and of the Ordinalism axiom. Indeed, two agents with identical preferences could have the
same utility function, in which case Equal Utility for Equal Function would require giving them equal
utilities, that is, in this case, giving them bundles on the same indiﬀerence curve. Under Ordinalism,
this latter consequence must still hold when the agents have identical preferences but diﬀerent utility
functions. Therefore, this axiom of Equal Welfare for Equal Preferences is the correct translation of
Equal Utility for Equal Function to a setting with ordinal non-comparable preferences.
41In addition, as noticed by Kolm (1972, 1996b), requiring No-Envy among two agents is equivalent to
requiring that there must be some common opportunity set over which these agents could choose their
preferred bundles.
42Define g(q) = f(qs/s0). Then g(
P
i s
0ci) = f(
P
i sci) for all cN . An allocation xN is feasible in
e = ((s, ..., s), uN , f) if and only if it is feasible in e0 = ((s0, ..., s0), uN , g).
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we are interested only in allocation rules which are neutral to such rescaling. Under such
a scale invariance constraint, an axiom of No-Envy among agents with a reference skill,
similar to Equal Resource for Reference Talent of the previous section, would actually be
equivalent to No-Envy among Uniformly Skilled, for any strictly positive reference skill.
It has not been noted in the literature, however, that if the reference skill is equal to zero,
the requirement is independent of any rescaling of skills and production function.43 In
addition, one may argue that the case when all agents have zero skill is particularly telling.
If no agent is productive, then we have a pure distribution economy as in the previous
model, and it seems clear that an equal sharing of the unproduced resource f(0) is the
only reasonable allocation, as recommended by No-Envy, when none of them works as
will be the case in Pareto-eﬃcient allocations (when labor has some disutility). It would
be very strange to discriminate between agents on the basis of their preferences over labor,
when they do not work.
No-Envy among Zero Skilled (NEZS):
∀ e = (sN , RN , f) ∈ E , xN ∈ S(e),
[∀i ∈ N, si = 0]⇒ [∀i, j ∈ N, xiRi xj].
One may also define stronger compensation and natural reward properties. The
Solidarity axiom of the previous section can be applied here rather directly. Skill Solidarity
is consistent with the idea of a collective sharing in the benefits of skills. It requires that
all the agents be aﬀected in the same direction if the profile of personal skills changes.
Skill Solidarity (SS, Fleurbaey and Maniquet 1999):
∀ e = (sN , uN , f), e0 = (s0N , uN , f) ∈ E , ∀xN ∈ S(e), ∀x0N ∈ S(e0),
∀i ∈ N, ui(xi) ≥ ui(x0i) or ∀i ∈ N, ui(x0i) ≥ ui(xi).
Strong natural reward axioms like Independence of Utilities cannot be directly trans-
posed to the current model, because with multi-dimensional external resources such ax-
ioms would conflict with Pareto-Eﬃciency. But some independence of changes in the
profile of utility functions is achievable under Pareto-Eﬃciency. This is done in par-
ticular by the Monotonicity axiom. This axiom, introduced in Maskin (1977), requires
that a selected allocation remain in the selection after a change in one agent’s preferences
whenever this change enlarges her lower contour set at her assigned bundle. Monotonicity
has played an important role in the implementation literature. It is quite interesting to
find a connection between incentive compatibility conditions, which require the allocation
rule not to be sensitive to personal characteristics which the agents can easily conceal
or misrepresent, and natural reward conditions, which justify a disregard of personal
characteristics for which the agents are responsible.
43An alternative solution to this diﬃculty is to limit application of the No-Envy condition to agents
with a reference value of “wage rate” wsi, where w is a supporting price. This is particularly natural in
the subdomain EL, where, in any given economy, the supporting price is the same for all Pareto-Eﬃcient
allocations. See Fleurbaey and Maniquet (2005), and the definition of SΨEE below.
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Monotonicity (M, Maskin 1977):
∀ e = (sN , uN , f) ∈ E , ∀xN ∈ S(e), ∀i ∈ N , ∀u0i ∈ U ,
[∀x ∈ Fi(e), ui(xi) ≥ ui(x)⇒ u0i(xi) ≥ u0i(x)]⇒ xN ∈ S
¡
sN , (uN\{i}, u0i), f
¢
.
When the allocation rule satisfies Equal Treatment of Equals, Monotonicity implies
No-Envy among Equally Skilled.44 Monotonicity also implies Ordinalism, as shown by
Maskin.
Several properties have been studied in the literature which are even stronger than
Monotonicity (see e.g. Nagahisa (1991)). The following property, introduced in Gaspart
(1996), requires that a selected allocation remain in the selection after a change in the
agents’ utility functions and in the skill profile whenever the allocation is Pareto-eﬃcient
in the new economy. This axiom implies Monotonicity for Pareto-eﬃcient allocation
rules. Interestingly, this axiom also has a flavor of compensation, since the selection is
also required to be independent, in some cases, of changes in the skill profile.45
Pareto Preserving Independence (PPI, Gaspart 1996, 1998):
∀ e = (sN , uN , f), e0 = (s0N , u0N , f) ∈ E , ∀xN ∈ S(e),
[xN ∈ PE(e0)]⇒ [xN ∈ S(e0)].
We may now present the general structure of this set of axioms.
44This is a consequence of a result in Fleurbaey and Maniquet (1997). The intuition for the proof is
as follows. Let e = (sN , uN , f). Suppose si = sj and xN ∈ S(e) is such that ui(xi) < ui(xj), i.e. i envies
j. Then one can find a function u∗ ∈ U such that u∗(xi) < u∗(xj) and:
∀x ∈ X, ui(xi) = ui(x)⇒ u∗(xi) = u∗(x),
∀x ∈ X, uj(xj) ≥ uj(x)⇒ u∗(xj) ≥ u∗(x).
By Monotonicity, xN ∈ S(sN , (uN\{i,j}, u∗, u∗), f). Since u∗(xi) 6= u∗(xj), this violates Equal Treatment
of Equals. By a similar argument, one can show thatMonotonicity and Equal Utility for Equal Function
imply No-Envy.
45An axiom of independence of skill levels is used in Yoshihara (2003). This axiom says that S(e) =
S(e0) whenever F (e) = F (e0) and e, e0 diﬀer only in the skill profile. The condition F (e) = F (e0) is never
obtained when f is increasing and the axiom is used by Yoshihara only for cases of constant f. Closer to
Gaspart’s axiom, Yamada and Yoshihara (2004) introduce an axiom which says that a selected allocation
remains selected whenever the skills of non-working agents change without altering the Pareto eﬃciency
of the allocation.
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Proposition 8 The following table describes the logical implications between axioms:
Compensation Natural Reward
PPI
⇓(3)
SS M ⇒O
⇓(1) ⇓(2)
EUEF ⇐ NE ⇒ NEES
⇓ ⇓
EUUF NEUS
⇓ ⇓
EURF NEZS
(1)Assuming that S satisfies Anonymity.
(2)Assuming that S satisfies Equal Treatment of Equals.
(3)Assuming that S satisfies Pareto-Eﬃciency.
The following allocation rules, studied in Fleurbaey and Maniquet (1996a, 1999) and
Gaspart (1996, 1998), are important when studying the possible combinations of com-
pensation and natural reward properties. First, the Egalitarian Equivalent rule selects
Pareto-eﬃcient allocations having the property that there is some consumption level c0
such that all agents are indiﬀerent between their assigned bundle and consuming c0 with-
out working at all.
Egalitarian Equivalence (SEE, Kolm 1968,46 Pazner and Schmeidler 1978a):
∀e = (sN , uN , f) ∈ E ,
SEE(e) = {xN ∈ PE(e) | ∀i ∈ N,∃ c0 ∈ R+, ui(xi) = ui(0, c0)}
This rule is just a member of more general family, defined as follows. An allocation
is selected if it is Pareto-eﬃcient and every agent’s utility is equal to her indirect utility
over a reference budget (the same for all agents).
Budget Egalitarian Equivalence (SΨEE):
∀ e = (sN , RN , f) ∈ E ,
SΨEE(e) =
½
xN ∈ PE(e) | ∃w ∈W (xN),∃x0 ∈ X,
∀ i ∈ N, ui(xi) = maxui (B(s˜, w, x0))
¾
,
where s˜ is such that ws˜ = Ψ(ws1, ..., wsn).47
46Kolm (1968) attributes this idea to Lange (1936), who proposed to compensate workers for the
disutility of their particular jobs, in his scheme of market socialism. But it is not clear in Lange’s writings
that such compensation would render all workers indiﬀerent to one and the same bundle (0, c0).
47The function Ψ bears on the wsi, because these values are independent of any joint rescaling of the
skills and the production function that leaves unchanged the set of feasible allocations.
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One has SΨEE = SEE when Ψ ≡ 0. Among the SΨEE family, SEE is the most favorable
to agents who have a strong aversion to labor, by making all indiﬀerence curves cross at a
point (0, c0). This automatically entails envy on behalf of “hard-working” agents toward
“lazy” agents (whose indiﬀerence curve will lie everywhere above the “hard-working”
agents’ curve, except at (0, c0)). The other SΨEE rules favor other preferences, depending
on Ψ. Since ws˜ is the slope of the reference budget in the (c, c)-space, the greater ws˜ the
better it is for agents who are willing to work. These allocation rules are therefore not
very neutral with respect to preferences.
Second, the Conditional Equality rule selects Pareto-eﬃcient allocations having the
property that an agent with reference preferences would be indiﬀerent between having
to choose among any of the budget sets of all the agents. This is a rather immediate
adaptation of the similar solution from the previous section.
Conditional Equality (SΦCE, Fleurbaey and Maniquet 1996a):
∀e = (sN , RN , f) ∈ E ,
SΦCE(e) =
½
xN ∈ PE(e) | ∃w ∈W (xN),∀ i, j ∈ N,
max u˜ (B(si, w, xi)) = max u˜ (B(sj, w, xj))
¾
,
where u˜ = Φ(u1, ..., un).
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- Figure 2: SΦCE -
Third, Objective Egalitarianism selects Pareto-eﬃcient allocations having the property
that an agent with reference preferences would be indiﬀerent between the bundles assigned
to all agents. This is another possible adaptation of the Conditional Equality rule of the
previous section.
Objective Egalitarianism (SΦOE, Gaspart 1996, 1998):
∀e = (sN , RN , f) ∈ E ,
SΦOE(e) = {xN ∈ PE(e) | ∀ i, j ∈ N, u˜ (xi) = u˜(xj)} ,
where u˜ = Φ(u1, ..., un).
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- Figure 3: SΦOE -
It is worth examining the redistributive consequences of the choice of u˜ in SΦCE and
SΦOE. With a function u˜ displaying a strong aversion to labor, SΦCE selects allocations
which perform little redistribution from high-skilled to low-skilled. Indeed, all individual
budget sets being equivalent for u˜, they must then be similar at low levels of labor, which
corresponds to a situation where profits of the firm are approximately equally divided,
and no compensation is made for diﬀerential skills. Conversely, with a u˜ displaying a very
low aversion to labor, SΦCE selects allocations which are very favorable to the low-skilled,
and quite unfavorable to the high-skilled.
For SΦOE the consequences are not exactly the same. With a u˜ displaying a very
low aversion to labor, for instance, consumption levels in selected allocations will be
substantially equalized, which is favorable to low-skilled agents, but also, among equally
skilled agents of any skill level, favorable to agents with a strong aversion to labor (they will
work less, without being penalized in terms of consumption). Conversely, a u˜ displaying
a strong aversion to labor is favorable to the high-skilled but also to the hard-working
agents. This shows that Objective Egalitarianism is not really neutral.
All the rules satisfy Pareto-Eﬃciency, Replication Invariance and Contraction Inde-
pendence, and all but SΦOE satisfy Equal Treatment of Equals and No Discrimination.
The following proposition examines how these rules fare in terms of compensation and
natural reward, and also depicts the conflict between these two principles.
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Proposition 9 The following table describes the incompatibilities (marked by
O
) be-
tween the main axioms of compensation and natural reward, under the assumption that
the allocation rule satisfies Pareto-Eﬃciency. The table also shows what axioms are sat-
isfied by the various solutions. Rule SΦOE does not satisfy NEES, NEUS or NEZS.48
PPI M NEES NEUS NEZS
SS
O O O O
SEE
EUEF
O O O SΨEE
(Ψ idempotent)
EUUF
O O SΦCE
(Φ idempotent)
EURF
SΦOE
(Φ constant)
SΦCE
(Φ constant)
Proof. We focus on the impossibilities and omit the rest.
SS and NEUS are incompatible. Let e = ((1, 1, 1), (u1, u2, u3), f) ∈ E be defined as
follows: u1(c, c) = c−c/10, u2(c, c) = c−9c/10, u3(c, c) = c−c, f(q) = min{q, 2}, and c =
1. Let S satisfy the axioms. Let xN ∈ S(e). By PE, c1 = c2 = 1, c3 = 0 and c1+c2+c3 = 2.
By NEUS, c1 = c2 and c3 ≤ c2 − 9/10. Therefore c1 ≥ c3 + 9/10, and replacing c3 by
2 − 2c1, one obtains c1 ≥ 29/30. Now, consider e0 = ((20, 20, 20), (u1, u2, u3), f) ∈ E and
x0N ∈ S(e0). By PE, c01 = 1/10, c02 = c03 = 0 and c01 + c02 + c03 = 2. By NEUS, c02 = c03 and
c02 ≥ c01− 9/100. Replacing c02 by 1− c01/2, one obtains c01 ≤ 218/300. The problem is that
u1(1/10, 218/300) < u1(1, 29/30), which implies that u1(x01) < u1(x1), in contradiction
with SS (by PE, at least one of the agents is better oﬀ in x0N).
EUEF and NEES are incompatible. Let e = ((s1, s2, s3, s4), (u1, u2, u3, u4), f) ∈ E
be defined as follows: s1 = s2 = 0, s3 = s4 = 1, u1(c, c) = u3(c, c) = c − c/4 and
u2(c, c) = u4(c, c) = c− c/2, f(q) = q and c = 1. Let S satisfy the axioms. Let xN ∈ S(e).
By PE, c1 = c2 = 0 and c3 = c4 = 1; by EUEF, c1 = c3 − 1/4 and c2 = c4 − 1/2. By
NEES, c1 = c2 and c3 = c4, which is incompatible with the previous equalities.
M and EUUF are incompatible. Let e = ((s1, s2), (u1, u2), f) ∈ E be defined as follows:
s1 = 0, s2 = 1, u1(c, c) = c − c/4 and u2(c, c) = c − c/2, f(q) = q and c = 1. Let S
satisfy the axioms. Let xN ∈ S(e). By PE, c1 = 0 and c3 = 1. Therefore, by M,
xN ∈ S(sN , (u1, u1), f) and xN ∈ S(sN , (u2, u2), f). By EUUF, in (sN , (u1, u1), f) one
must have c1 = c2 − 1/4, whereas in (sN , (u2, u2), f) one must have c1 = c2 − 1/2. These
two equalities cannot be satisfied simultaneously by xN .
In the above proof of the incompatibility between Equal Utility for Equal Function
andNo-Envy among Equally Skilled, a very weak part ofNo-Envy among Equally Skilled
has been used, namely, the condition that among two equally skilled agents, no one must
have more consumption than the other, when they work the same. This shows how strong
48Notice that, since it does not satisfy Equal Treatment of Equals, the fact that it satisfiesMonotonicity
does not guarantee that it satisfies these other axioms.
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the incompatibility with Equal Utility for Equal Function is. Since the Equal Utility for
Equal Function andNo-Envy among Equally Skilled axioms involved in this theorem are
logical consequences of the No-Envy axiom, the negative result obtained by Pazner and
Schmeidler (1974) about the existence of Pareto-eﬃcient and envy-free allocations is just
a corollary of this proposition, and the diﬃculties with No-Envy can be explained by the
fact that this requirement combines compensation and natural reward in a too demanding
way.49
The lack of neutrality of SEE, SΨEE and SΦOE with respect to individual preferences,
which has been noticed above, can be explained by the fact that these rules fail to satisfy
important natural reward axioms, as stated in the proposition.
Characterization results have been provided for some of these rules. Some of them
involve a Consistency axiom which is the proper adaptation of the Consistency defined
above to the current framework. Its precise definition is somewhat technical and is omitted
here.50
Proposition 10 (Fleurbaey and Maniquet 1999) The Egalitarian Equivalent rule SEE is
the smallest rule, with respect to inclusion, satisfying Pareto Eﬃciency, EqualUtility for
Equal Function, No-Envy among Zero Skilled, No Discrimination, and Consistency.51
Proposition 11 (Fleurbaey and Maniquet 1996a) If S satisfies Pareto Eﬃciency, Equal
Utility forReference Function,Monotonicity, NoDiscrimination and Contraction Inde-
pendence, then there is a constant Φ such that for all e ∈ E, SΦCE(e) ⊆ S(e). The same
result is obtained if Monotonicity is replaced by No-Envy among Equally Skilled and
Consistency.
Proof. The structure of the proofs of the results involving Consistency is very similar
to that of Propositions 3 and 4 above. We only provide the proof of the first part of the
latter proposition.
Let S satisfy PE, EURF, M, ND and CI. Let e ∈ E . Let u˜ ∈ U be such that EURF
is satisfied for it, and consider the constant function Φ ≡ u˜. Let xN ∈ SΦCE(e) with a
49As an alternative direction of research, one can also try and identify subdomains of economies where
the incompatibilities presented above do not hold. For instance, Piketty (1994) identified a domain
restriction under which No-Envy and Pareto-Eﬃciency are compatible. Any e = (sN , uN , f) ∈ EL
satisfies this domain restriction if and only if for all i, j ∈ N such that si ≤ sj , for all x, x0 ∈ X such that
ui(x) = ui(x0), x0 < x⇒ uj(x) ≥ uj(x0).
This condition, which says that the less productive agents have a lower willingness to work as well,
is quite strong. It implies the Spence-Mirrlees single crossing condition (usually defined on earnings-
consumption bundles), but is much stronger.
50When one considers a subeconomy, one has to delete the consumption and labor of the rest of the
population. This deletion may render the resulting production function non-concave. The consistency
condition can then only be applied when the reduced economy is still in the domain E . See Fleurbaey
and Maniquet (1996a, 1999) for details, and also Thomson (1988), Moulin and Shenker (1994).
51See Fleurbaey and Maniquet (1999), Prop. 7. This proposition relies, instead of No-Envy among
Zero Skilled, on Work Alone Lower Bound, an axiom defined in Subsection 3.4. But No-Envy among
Zero Skilled would play the same role in the proof asWork Alone Lower Bound.
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supporting price w ∈ W (xN). Let e0 = (sN , u0N , g) ∈ E be defined by: for all i ∈ N ,
u0i(c, c) = c− siwc, and g(q) =
P
i∈N(ci − siwci) + wq.
We claim that S(e0) = SΦCE(e0). Suppose not. Let x0N ∈ S(e0) \ SΦCE(e0). Let x00N
be defined by: for all i ∈ N , x00i ∈ argmaxx∈B(si,w,x0i) u˜(x). One has x
00
N ∈ F (e0). By ND,
x00N ∈ S(e0). By M, x00N ∈ S(sN , (u˜, . . . , u˜), g), violating EURF because by construction
x00N /∈ SΦCE(sN , (u˜, . . . , u˜), g), so that there are i, j such that u˜(x00i ) 6= u˜(x00j ). Therefore
S(e0) ⊆ SΦCE(e0). By ND again, one actually has S(e0) = SΦCE(e0).
By ND, xN ∈ S(e0) as well. By M, xN ∈ S(sN , uN , g). By CI, one finally concludes
that xN ∈ S(e).
As in the monetary compensation problem, the allocation rules can be interpreted as
derived from social ordering functions which rationalize them. In particular, the following
social ordering function rationalizes the Egalitarian Equivalent rule SEE. It applies the
leximin criterion to numerical representations of preferences which are constructed by
measuring the distance between the (0, 0) bundle and the intersection of an indiﬀerence
curve with the axes.
Egalitarian Equivalent ordering function (REE, Fleurbaey and Maniquet 2005):
∀ e ∈ E , ∀xN , x0N ∈ Xn,
xN REE(e)x0N ⇔ (vi(xi))i∈N ≥lex (vi(x0i))i∈N
where for all i ∈ N , vi(x) is defined by ui(x) = ui(0, vi(x)) or ui(x) = ui(−vi(x), 0).
The definition of the appropriate social ordering functions rationalizing SΦCE and
SΦOE over E is yet an open question, but things are easier for SΦCE on the domain EL.
For this domain, one can rely on the notion of implicit budget IB(s, u, x), which is the
smallest budget set which enables an agent with skill s and utility function u to obtain
the utility level u(x). For s ∈ R+, u ∈ U , x ∈ X, the implicit budget IB(s, u, x) is defined
by
IB(s, u, x) = {(c0, c0) ∈ X | c0 − sc0 ≤ eu(s, u(x))} ,
where eu(., .) is the expenditure function
eu(s, v) = min {c− sc | (c, c) ∈ X, u(c, c) ≥ v} .
Notice that the bundle x need not belong to the implicit budget IB(s, u, x). Then, we have
the following social ordering function, which rationalizes SΦCE by applying the leximin
criterion to the implicit budgets of the agents evaluated with the reference utility function.
Conditional Equality ordering function (RΦCE, Fleurbaey and Maniquet 2005):
∀ e ∈ EL, ∀xN , x0N ∈ Xn,
[xN RΦCE(e)x0N ]⇔ (max u˜ (IB(si, ui, xi)))i∈N ≥lex (max u˜ (IB(si, ui, x0i)))i∈N ,
where u˜ = Φ(u1, ..., un).
Fleurbaey and Maniquet (2005) provide characterizations of these and other social
ordering functions in the domain EL, relying on axioms which are inspired by the above
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axioms of compensation and natural reward. We do not go into details here, and only
explain how the idea of compensation can suggest various axioms, which bear interesting
relations with other parts of the literature.
The Equal Utility for Equal Function axiom, for allocation rules, requires equalizing
utilities of agents having the same utility function. A social ordering function, similarly,
may be required to be averse to welfare inequality among agents having the same util-
ity functions. This may be captured by the following property, which is essentially an
application of Hammond’s equity axiom (Hammond 1976), expressing an infinite degree
of inequality aversion. The diﬀerence with Hammond’s equity axiom is the restriction to
agents with identical utility functions.
Hammond Compensation (Fleurbaey and Maniquet 2005):
∀e = (sN , uN , f) ∈ EL, ∀xN , x0N ∈ Xn, if there exist i, j ∈ N such that:
i) ∀k ∈ N , k 6= i, j ⇒ xk = x0k,
ii) ui = uj,
iii) uj(xj) > uj(x0j) > ui(x0i) > ui(xi),
then x0N P (e)xN .
As shown in Fleurbaey and Maniquet (2002), one can also rely on the Pigou-Dalton
principle of transfer in order to express the same idea, albeit with a milder (arbitrarily
small) degree of inequality aversion. The Pigou-Dalton principle is usually applied in
studies of one-dimensional inequalities in income.52 Here income (c) inequality is also
reduced, but the principle is applied only to agents with identical utility functions and
with identical and unchanged labor (c).53
Pigou-Dalton Compensation (Fleurbaey and Maniquet 2002):
∀e = (sN , uN , f) ∈ EL, ∀xN , x0N ∈ Xn, if there exist i, j ∈ N and δ > 0 such that:
i) ∀k ∈ N , k 6= i, j ⇒ xk = x0k,
ii) ui = uj,
iii) ci = c0i = cj = c0j,
iv) c0j = cj − δ > ci + δ = c0i,
then x0N P (e)xN .
The study of social ordering functions is particularly relevant for applications of the
ethical principles of compensation and natural reward to contexts where the Pareto-
eﬃcient allocation rules cannot be implemented. The most important case for applications
is income taxation, when neither si nor ci is observed by the redistributive agencies and
redistribution must be made only on the basis of earned income sici. Such applications
are discussed below.
52See e.g. Sen (1973).
53With less restrictions, this axiom would clash with the Pareto principle. See e.g. Fleurbaey and
Trannoy (2003).
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3.3 Bundle equality and welfare lower bounds
The incompatibility between compensation and natural reward has been dealt with above
by weakening the requirements. One may find, however, that the weakenings of the main
axioms Equal Utility for Equal Function andNo-Envy among Equally Skilled, presented
above, are unsatisfactory. For instance, Equal Utility for Equal Function requires welfare
equality, that is, an infinite inequality aversion, whenever two agents have identical utility
functions. By weakening it into either Equal Utility for Uniform Function or Equal
Utility for Reference Function, we have kept the infinite inequality requirement but
restricted its application in a sharp way. In two approaches presented now, the infinite
inequality aversion is dropped. In the first approach, developed by Gaspart (1996), the
emphasis is put on bundle equality. In the second approach, developed by Maniquet
(1998), the emphasis is put on opportunity sets of bundles. The two approaches also
have in common that each axiom is now intended to simultaneously capture (imperfect)
compensation and natural reward requisites.
We begin with two examples of properties in the first approach. These properties are
consistent with the idea that bundles should be equalized (though not at the expense of
eﬃciency). No Domination by the Average Bundle requires that no bundle be composed
of both a larger labor time than the average labor time and a lower consumption than
the average consumption. The idea is that no agent should so badly treated (e.g. because
of a low skill –compensation– or a particular utility function –natural reward) that he
must work more than average for a lower than average consumption.
No Domination by the Average Bundle (Gaspart 1996):
∀e = (sN , uN , f) ∈ E , ∀xN ∈ S(e), ∀i ∈ N ,
ci ≤
P
j∈N cj
#N
or ci ≥
P
j∈N cj
#N
.
The axiom of Selection of Eﬃcient Egalitarian Allocations requires that whenever a
Pareto-eﬃcient allocation composed of equal bundles exists, it is selected. When all
agents have the same bundle, it seems clear that no advantage is given to anyone on the
basis of his skill (compensation) or utility function (natural reward). Equality of resources
and No-Envy cannot be more simply and clearly satisfied.
Selection of Eﬃcient Egalitarian Allocations (Gaspart 1996):
∀e = (sN , uN , f) ∈ E , ∀xN ∈ F (e), ∀x ∈ X,
[∀i ∈ N, xi = x and xN ∈ PE(e)]⇒ [xN ∈ S(e)].
As explained above, bundle equality is consistent with responsibility for one’s utility
function and the principle of natural reward. In addition, by considering labor time-
consumption bundles (c, c) rather than eﬃcient labor-consumption bundles (cˆ, c), the two
axioms above also convey an idea of skill compensation.
It is interesting to examine the compatibility scheme between these axioms and the
compensation and responsibility properties previously presented. The results are pre-
sented in the following theorem. Two main lessons may be drawn from those results.
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First, axioms based on the desirability of material equality are more easily combined with
responsibility and reward properties than with compensation properties. Secondly, they
highlight a new solution, the proportional allocation rule.
Proposition 12 (Gaspart 1996, 1998) There exist Pareto-eﬃcient allocation rules satis-
fying Replication Invariance, Contraction Independence, and each of the following lists
of axioms:
1. NoDomination by theAverage Bundle, Selection of Eﬃcient EgalitarianAllocations
and Pareto Preserving Independence;
2. Selection of Eﬃcient Egalitarian Allocations and Equal Utility for Equal Function.
On the other hand, no Pareto-eﬃcient allocation rule can satisfy any of the following
pairs of axioms:
1. No Domination by the Average Bundle and Equal Utility for Reference Function;
2. Selection of Eﬃcient Egalitarian Allocations and Skill Solidarity.
The first statement of the theorem is proved by an example. The Proportional rule
selects Pareto-eﬃcient allocations having the property that the consumption-labor ratio
ci/ci is identical among agents.
The Proportional Rule (SP , Roemer and Silvestre 1989, Gaspart 1998):
∀e = (sN , uN , f) ∈ E ,
SP (e) = {xN ∈ PE(e) | ∃r ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ N, ci = rci} .
The Proportional rule satisfies No Domination by the Average Bundle, Selection of
Eﬃcient Egalitarian Allocations and Pareto Preserving Independence. This rule fails
to satisfy No Discrimination and Equal Treatment of Equals. It is given axiomatic char-
acterizations, on the basis of Pareto Preserving Independence but also by reference to
the family of solutions belonging to Objective Egalitarianism (defined above), in Gaspart
(1998).
The compatibility between Selection of Eﬃcient Egalitarian Allocations and Equal
Utility for Equal Function is an immediate consequence of the fact that a Pareto-eﬃcient
egalitarian allocation often fails to exist in economies where two agents have equal pref-
erences but unequal skills. Therefore, these two requirements bear on two essentially
disjoint sets of economies.54
Now, we turn to the second approach, due to Maniquet (1998), in which allocation
rules are required to guarantee “equal rights”. The idea is to grant all agents an identical
opportunity set in X, and to require the allocation rule to give every agent a bundle which
she weakly prefers to her best choice in the opportunity set. The common opportunity
set in X is called an equal right, since every agent has a definite right to be as well-oﬀ as
if her choice was really to be made in this opportunity set.
54As an example, consider the rule which selects egalitarian allocations whenever they are eﬃcient, and
coincides with SEE otherwise. This rule satisfies Selection of Eﬃcient Egalitarian Allocations and Equal
Utility for Equal Function, in addition to Pareto Eﬃciency, Replication Invariance and Contraction
Independence.
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This equal right is, formally, a compact subset of X. Moreover, Maniquet (1998)
suggests that, as an unconditional right, this opportunity set should not depend on the
profile uN . Feasibility constraints impose, however, to take account of sN and f. In an
economy, e = (sN , uN , f), an equal right must then be a subset E(sN , f) ⊂ X such that
E(sN , f)n ∈ F (e).
The guarantee of equal right then takes the form of the following axiom. Following
Maniquet (1998), we restrict the domain to the set E+ ⊂ E of economies where agents
have a strictly positive skill.55
Guarantee of equal right E (Maniquet 1998):
∀e = (sN , uN , f) ∈ E+, ∀xN ∈ S(e),
∀i ∈ N, ui(xi) ≥ maxui(E(sN , f)).
Let us note that if an equal rightE does not satisfy the feasibility constraintE(sN , f)n ∈
F (e), then it cannot be guaranteed by any allocation rule.
An equal right is compensating low skilled agents, since the lower bound levels
maxui(E(sN , f)) guaranteed to two agents having the same utility function are the same.
Moreover, in line with natural reward, it leaves the agents responsible for their choice over
the opportunity set, so that the diﬀerence between the minimal welfare levels guaranteed
to two agents having the same skill only reflects their diﬀerent utility function. The com-
pensation it carries out, however, may be rather low, if the equal right itself is small. This
suggests trying to find large equal rights.
Let us summarize the main results obtained by this approach. First, an equal right
cannot be very large. In other words, we come back here to the fundamental trade-oﬀ
between compensation and natural reward. Second, an equal right can easily be combined
with strong requirements of either skill compensation or natural reward. Third, when
combining equal rights with skill compensation or natural reward properties, we come
back, essentially, to standard allocation rules.
Looking for an equal right which is as large as possible, Maniquet (1998) shows that
a prominent family of equal right correspondences E(., .) is the following. Let cB ∈ [0, c]
be given.
cB-equal right (Maniquet 1998):
EcB(sN , f) =
(
(c, c) ∈ X |c ≥ cB, c ≤ 1
n
f
ÃX
i
sicB
!)
.
Imposing some cB-equal right is compatible with almost any compensation or natural
reward requirement. Let Ec+ ⊂ E+ be the subdomain such that for every e = (sN , uN , f) ∈
Ec+, every i ∈ N, every x ∈ X, there exists c0 ∈ R+ such that ui(c, c0) ≥ u(x), that is,
working maximal time c can always be compensated by enough consumption.
55This additional assumption simplifies the analysis, since it implies that the sets of weak and strong
Pareto eﬃcient allocations coincide. Moreover, the two last results mentioned in this subsection hold true
only if this assumption is made.
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Proposition 13 (Maniquet 1998) Let cB ∈ [0, c] be given. There exist allocation rules
guaranteeing the cB-equal right which satisfy Pareto-Eﬃciency, Replication Invariance,
Equal Treatment of Equals, Contraction Independence, and each one of the following
axioms or lists of axioms:
1. Skill Solidarity over Ec+;
2. Equal Utility for Equal Function and No-Envy among Uniformly Skilled;
3. Equal Utility for Uniform Function and No-Envy among Equally Skilled over Ec+;
4. Monotonicity.
We restrict our attention to examples of compatibility 1 and 4. The cB-Egalitarian
Equivalent rule ScBEE selects Pareto-eﬃcient allocations having the property that there
is some consumption level c0 such that all agents are indiﬀerent between their assigned
bundle and the (cB, c0) bundle.
cB-Egalitarian Equivalent rule (ScBEE, Maniquet 1998):
∀e = (sN , RN , f) ∈ Ec+,
ScBEE = {xN ∈ PE(e) | ∃ c0 ∈ R+, ∀i ∈ N, ui(xi) = ui(cB, c0)} .
The Egalitarian Equivalent rule SEE is obviously an element of the ScBEE family of rules.
For a given cB, the ScBEE rule satisfies Pareto-Eﬃciency, Skill Solidarity, Consistency,
Replication Invariance,No Discrimination and guarantees the cB-Equal Right. Moreover,
Maniquet (1998) shows that it is the only one to satisfy such properties on a relevant
domain (extended to non-concave production functions). The argument is similar to the
proof of Proposition 10.
The cB-equal budget rules select Pareto-eﬃcient allocations having the property that
all budget lines cross at a point of abscissa cB.
cB-Equal Budget rule (ScBEB, Kolm 1996a, Maniquet 1998):
∀e = (sN , RN , f) ∈ E+,
ScBEB(e) =
½
xN ∈ PE(e) | ∃w ∈W (xN),∀i, j ∈ N,
ci − siw(ci − cB) = cj − sjw(cj − cB)
¾
.
Notice that for any e, there is Φ such that ScBEB(e) = SΦCE(e). Therefore ScBEB can
almost be seen as a member of the Conditional Equality family of allocation rules. This
rule satisfies Pareto-Eﬃciency, Monotonicity, Consistency, Replication Invariance, No
Discrimination and guarantees the cB-Equal Right. Moreover, Maniquet (1998) shows
that it is the smallest one, with respect to inclusion, to satisfy this list of axioms, on the
subdomain of E+ with diﬀerentiable production functions. The argument is similar to the
proof of Proposition 11.
Kolm (1996a, 2004a,b) defends the cB-Equal Budget rule as intuitively appealing, since
it corresponds to an equal sharing of the agents’ earnings sici on the first cB units of labor,
the rest being left to every agent. Kolm suggests that cB/c can be interpreted as the degree
of egalitarianism of the allocation rule, with respect to earnings. With cB/c = 0, the cB-
Equal Budget rule coincides with Varian’s (1974) Equal Wealth rule, consisting in an equal
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sharing of profits and no sharing of earnings. With cB/c = 1, the allocation coincides with
Pazner and Schmeidler’s (1978b) Full-Income-Fair rule, with all budget lines crossing at
c = c.
The choice of cB for the cB-Egalitarian Equivalent rule has radically diﬀerent impli-
cations. Whatever cB, this rule performs a substantial compensation at the benefit of
low-skilled agents. But with a low cB, ScBEE(e) is more favorable to the agents who have
a strong aversion to labor, and conversely with a high cB. For instance, it is clearly better
for an agent with strong aversion to labor to have all indiﬀerence curves crossing at cB = 0
than at a greater cB. Unsurprisingly, this rule therefore fails to be neutral with respect
to various kinds of individual preferences. This is just a consequence of the fact that, by
being good at compensation, this rule is not so good in terms of natural reward.
3.4 Limited self-ownership
The compensation principle may be criticized for contradicting the idea that agents, in
particular high-skilled agents, should be free to take advantage of their skill, at least to the
extent that society should not force them to work to the benefit of low skilled agents. We
will show that some of the proposed solutions pass some reasonable tests of self-ownership.
Pazner and Schmeidler’s (1978b) Full-Income-Fair rule, which is at the same time an
cB-Equal Budget rule with cB = c and a Conditional Equality rule with u˜ defined by:
u˜(c, c) = c, has been criticized by Varian (1974) and Dworkin (1981b), on the basis that
this rule is very hard for the skilled agents, since they are heavily taxed, and may actually
be forced to work in order to be just able to pay taxes and have a zero consumption (the
“slavery of the talented”). On the other hand, Varian’s (1974) Equal Wealth rule, which
is the cB-Equal Budget rule with cB = 0, does not display the same shortcoming, but, as
noticed above, does not perform any compensation of skill inequalities.
We can formalize the criticism by noting that the Full-Income-Fair rule does not satisfy
the following participation property.
Participation:
∀e = (sN , uN , f) ∈ E , ∀xN ∈ S(e), ∀i ∈ N, ui(xi) ≥ ui(0, 0).
Actually, this criticism can be addressed to almost all members of the Conditional
Equality and cB-Equal Budget families. Moreover, a similar criticism can be addressed
to almost all cB-Egalitarian Equivalent rules, even if in this case agents who are likely to
be worse oﬀ than at (0, 0) are the “lazy” agents (that is, agents with a low willingness to
work), rather than the talented.
Proposition 14 (Fleurbaey and Maniquet 1996a, Maniquet 1998) The Equal Wealth
rule is the only Conditional Equality rule and the only c∗-Equal Budget rule satisfying
Participation. The Egalitarian Equivalent rule is the only cB-Egalitarian Equivalent rule
satisfying Participation.
Since the Equal Wealth rule simply selects the equal-dividend laisser-faire allocations
and does not perform any compensation for skill inequalities, this result is quite negative
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for the families of Conditional Equality rules and cB-Equal Budget rules. In contrast, the
Egalitarian Equivalent rule does satisfy substantial compensation axioms.
The participation welfare level is quite low and Participation is consistent with a very
limited idea of self-ownership. A higher guarantee is provided by the following property.
Work alone lower bound (WALB, Fleurbaey and Maniquet 1999):
∀e = (sN , uN , f) ∈ E , ∀xN ∈ S(e),
ui(xi) ≥ EUUFi(e),
where
EUUFi(e) = max
©
u¯ | ∃x0N ∈ F (e),∀j 6= i, cj = 0, u¯ = ui(x0i) = ui(x0j)
ª
.
This axiom guarantees that no agent is worse oﬀ than in the hypothetical situation in
which he alone works and feeds the other agents just enough to be indiﬀerent between his
bundle and theirs. The two rules identified in the previous theorem satisfy this individual
rationality constraint. Moreover, we have the following results.
Proposition 15 (Fleurbaey and Maniquet (1999)) The Egalitarian Equivalent rule is
the only rule satisfying Pareto-Eﬃciency, NoDiscrimination, Skill Solidarity and Work
Alone Lower Bound.
Proof. Let S satisfy the axioms. First, we prove that for all e ∈ E , S(e) ⊆ SEE(e).
Suppose not. Then there is e ∈ E , xN ∈ S(e) \ SEE(e). Recall vi from the definition
of the Egalitarian Equivalent ordering function REE. By PE, maxi∈N vi(xi) ≥ 0. Since
xN /∈ SEE(e), for some j ∈ N, uj(0,maxi∈N vi(xi)) > uj(xj). Let s0j ∈ R+ and e0 =
((0, . . . , s0j, . . . , 0), uN , f) be chosen so that there is x0N ∈ PE(e0) such that for all i ∈ N,
ui(x0i) = ui(xi) (such a s0j can be found, by continuity of the ui and of f). By PE, SS, and
ND, x0N ∈ S(e0), violating WALB for j.
Second, we prove that S(e) = SEE(e). By SS, S is single-valued in utility. Therefore,
by ND, S(e) = SEE(e).
Proposition 16 The EqualWealth rule is the smallest allocation rule satisfying Contraction
Independence, No Discrimination, Monotonicity and Work Alone Lower Bound.
The proof is similar to that of Proposition 11, noting that in a linear economy like
e0 = (sN , u0N , g) defined there, Work Alone Lower Bound imposes that for all j ∈ N ,
u0j(x0j) ≥ u0j(0, 1#N
P
i∈N(ci − siwci)).
4 The utilitarian approach to responsibility
We now turn to the literature which has adopted a radically diﬀerent approach, based
on the utilitarian reward principle.56 This literature combines egalitarian and utilitarian
56As mentioned in the introduction, an early application of an unmodified utilitarian criterion to the
issue of compensation has been made by Arrow (1971), and Sen (1973) emphasized the fact that this can
lead to transfers in the wrong direction, because handicapped agents are likely to have a lower marginal
utility. A more egalitarian approach, but still with comparable welfare, has been studied by Otsuki
(1996).
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social welfare functions in the construction of a new kind of complex social welfare func-
tions. Such social welfare functions display inequality aversion only in the dimensions of
diﬀerential talents and circumstances that call for compensation.57
4.1 Framework
A distinctive feature of this approach is that it disregards the economic structure of the
allocation problem and even the functional form of the function u(x, y, z), in order to
focus on the outcomes eventually obtained by agents with diﬀerent characteristics (y, z).
The objects of evaluation are, typically, functions or matrices (uyz)y∈Y,z∈Z where uyz is
the outcome (an index of utility, or functionings, etc.) achieved by agents with talent y
and eﬀort z. For simplicity we will assume that y and z are independently distributed.58
Let py (resp. pz) be the proportion of the population with talent y (resp. eﬀort z). Let
uy = (uyz)z∈Z (a row-vector) and uz = (uyz)y∈Y (a column-vector). One can interpret uy
as describing the “opportunities” open to agents with talent y, and one can even think of
a related opportunity set as defined by (assuming non-negative values for outcomes)
Oy = {u ∈ RZ+ | u ≤ uy}.
A graphical representation of such a set, that takes account of the distribution of z in the
population, is presented in Figure 4.
-
1
6u
0 pz1 pz2 pz3
uyz1
uyz2
uyz3
- Figure 4 -
In this setting, the compensation principle remains applicable and implies that in-
equalities within vectors uz are bad. On the other hand, in this abstract framework it is
impossible to formulate the idea of equal resources or of neutrality with respect to z, so
that natural reward cannot even be conceived. It is then understandable that most of the
57The literature reviewed in this section includes Bossert, Fleurbaey and Van de gaer (1999), Goux
and Maurin (2002), Hild and Voorhoeve (2004), Mariotti (2003), Ooghe and Lauwers (2003), Ooghe,
Schokkaert and Van de gaer (2003), Peragine (2002, 2004), Roemer (1993, 1998, 2002), Schokkaert and
Van de gaer (1994), Van de gaer (1993).
58Roemer constructs z so that this always holds. See below.
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literature has adopted a utilitarian kind of reward, translating the idea that inequalities
within vectors uy are acceptable into the idea that the social evaluation may have no
aversion to inequality over such vectors.
Recall that one consequence of natural reward was ordinalism, discarding information
about utilities as distinct from purely ordinal preferences. Another distinctive feature of
the approach reviewed here is that individual preferences are no longer suﬃcient informa-
tion, and a cardinally measurable and interpersonally comparable index of achievement u
is needed and plays a key role in the evaluation of social situations.
One may wonder whether this framework should be described as welfarist (in the
formal sense59). It occupies a sort of middle position. A pure welfarist approach would
simply rank vectors (ui)i∈N and would take account neither of individual characteristics
yi, zi nor of resource allocation. This framework ranks matrices (uyz)y∈Y,z∈Z but still
ignores how the individuals are treated in terms of resources. These diﬀerences can be
illustrated with Example 1.
Example 1 (pursued). Recall that u = (x+ y) z, where x, y and z are real numbers.
Suppose that each category of individuals contains only one person and that the four
individuals have the following characteristics in two diﬀerent situations:
y \ z 1 3
1 individual 1 individual 2
3 individual 3 individual 4
Situation S1
y \ z 1 3
1 individual 1 individual 3
3 individual 2 individual 4
Situation S2
Suppose that one declares policy B to be better than policy A in situation S1. Then,
under pure welfarism, one should also declare policy B¯ to be better than policy A¯ in
situation S2 (if they were feasible), because they yield the same distribution of utilities
as policies B and A, respectively:
Policy A¯
i x and u
1
x = 5
u = 6
2
x = 15
u = 18
3
x = 1
u = 6
4
x = 3
u = 18
Policy B¯
i x and u
1
x = 2
u = 3
2
x = 24
u = 27
3
x = 0
u = 3
4
x = 5
u = 27
In contrast, by looking at the distribution of uyz one is able to say that policy B¯ is worse
than A¯ in situation S2, because it oﬀers individuals with a low y the grim opportunities
(3, 3) instead of (6, 6) with A¯.
59Welfarism of the formal sort is compatible with any subjective or objective interpretation of the
utility index u. A more substantive (or philosophical) brand of welfarism focuses on subjective utility.
On this distinction, see Mongin and d’Aspremont (1998), d’Aspremont and Gevers (2002).
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Now, consider the alternative technology u = (x+ y)z2/2. Under this technology, the
same distributions of uyz as with policies A and B can be obtained with the following
policies:
Policy Â
y \ z 1 3
1
x = 11
u = 6
x = 3
u = 18
3
x = 9
u = 6
x = 1
u = 18
Policy Bˆ
y \ z 1 3
1
x = 5
u = 3
x = 5
u = 27
3
x = 3
u = 3
x = 3
u = 27
If one looks only at the distributions of uyz, one is forced to rank Â and Bˆ in the same
way as A and B. In contrast, a non-welfarist criterion can prefer A to B and Bˆ to Â,
because A and Bˆ are more neutral with respect to individuals’ exercise of responsibility.
One has to look at the allocation of x in order to see that B strongly rewards a high z,
while Â strongly punishes it.
4.2 Social welfare functions
Two prominent social welfare functions have been proposed in order to rank distributions
of uyz. Van de gaer (1993) introduced the following:
X
y∈Y
py ϕ
ÃX
z∈Z
pzuyz
!
,
where ϕ is a concave function. The idea is to compute the average outcome for each class
of y, which can also be interpreted as the population-weighted area of the opportunity set
Oy : X
z∈Z
pzuyz
(this is the area delineated in Figure 4) and the concavity of ϕ is meant to embody a social
aversion to inequality of such average outcomes. Schokkaert and Van de gaer (1994) and
Peragine (2002, 2004)60 rely on this criterion in order to study various types of Lorenz
dominance of distributions of characteristics.
Here we will focus on the maximin version of Van de gaer’s social welfare function,
which exhibits an infinite aversion to inequalities across y, which is better in line with the
60Van de gaer (1993) actually considered a continuum, so that his social welfare function writesZ
Y
ϕ
µZ
Z
uyzg(z)dz
¶
f(y)dy,
where f(y) and g(z) the density functions of y and z. Peragine considers a population with a finite
number of y, a continuum of z, and a linearized version of the criterion:X
y
ny
n
αy
Z
Z
uyzg(z)dz,
where αy is an ethical weight expressing priority for subpopulations with a “low” y.
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compensation principle. We will call it the “min of means” social welfare function:
WminM = min
y∈Y
ÃX
z∈Z
pzuyz
!
,
The second prominent social welfare function, due to Roemer (1993, 1998), is com-
puted as
WM min =
X
z∈Z
pzmin
y∈Y
uyz.
One sees that it inverts the position of min and mean, so that we may call it the “mean of
mins” social welfare function. It still applies an infinite inequality aversion across y and
no inequality aversion across z.61 Interestingly, it can be interpreted as the population-
weighted area of the intersection of opportunity sets\
y∈Y
Oy.
-
1
6u
0
min-of-means
pz1 pz2 pz3
uy1z1
uy1z2
uy1z3
uy2z1
uy2z2
uy2z3
-
1
6u
0
mean-of-mins
pz1 pz2 pz3
- Figure 5 -
Both criteria boil down to ordinary utilitarianism
WU =
X
y,z
pypzuyz
if all agents in the population have the same y. They may therefore advocate transferring
resources to agents with parameter z inducing higher marginal utility.62 This illustrates
61Roemer actually focused on the case of a discrete y and continuous z, so that
WM min =
Z
Z
µ
min
y∈Y
uyz
¶
g(z)dz.
This has to do with his particular statistical measurement of z, which is explained below.
62In the production model of Section 3, when agents have identical utility functions ui(c, c), a utilitarian
planner would choose a Pareto-eﬃcient allocation such that agents with higher skill obtain a lower utility,
as shown by Mirrlees (1974). In Roemer (1998, p. 68), in an example dealing with unemployment
insurance, the optimal policy for WM min produces more inequalities than the laisser-faire.
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the contrast with the solutions relying on the natural reward principle, which would
advocate equal resources in this case.
It is also worth noting that the summation over z featured in these social welfare
functions tends to enter in conflict with the principle of compensation, even though the
maximin criterion is applied over y. This conflict can be shown in Example 1.
Example 1 (pursued). The utilitarian-like policy B presented in Example 1 is actually
not the best according to the min-of-means and mean-of-mins social welfare functions.
One computes that, under policy B, WminM = WM min = 15 (recall that y and z are
independently distributed, with equal population size for each value). An alternative
policy can do better for both criteria:
Policy BB
y \ z 1 3
1
x = 0
u = 1
x = 9
u = 30
3
x = 0
u = 3
x = 7
u = 30
Under policy BB, one obtains WminM =WM min = 15.5.What happens is that it is better
to sacrifice the undeserving poor and redistribute the two units of resources they receive
in policy B to deserving agents, who are able to transform one unit of resource into three
units of utility. This is done at the cost of forgoing compensation among the undeserving
subpopulation.
In the quasi-linear case of Subsection 2.4, marginal utility is always equal to one, in-
dependently of the agent’s characteristics y and z. Then the opposition between natural
reward and utilitarian reward is diminished and the conflict between utilitarian reward
and compensation is also reduced, as the utilitarian criteria tend to entail a large indiﬀer-
ence between allocations (ordinary utilitarianism is then indiﬀerent between all feasible
allocations63). Bossert, Fleurbaey and Van de gaer (1999) notice that, in this particular
framework, the SOACE rule, which satisfies Equal Resource for Equal Talent, always se-
lects a best allocation for WminM , which shows a relative compatibility between natural
reward and utilitarian reward in this case. On the other hand, all egalitarian-equivalent
rules SΨEE, SΨPAE, SAEE, SAPAE and SOAEE select best allocations forWM min. Actually,
the only thing thatWM min then requires is that agents with equal z obtain equal utilities,
proving a compatibility between compensation and utilitarian reward in this particular
case.
4.3 Min-of-means or mean-of-mins?
The last paragraph in the previous subsection, and related analysis in an optimal taxation
problem by Schokkaert et al. (2004), suggest that WM min is somehow stronger in com-
pensation, and therefore more egalitarian, than WminM . This is not always true, however,
as the following example shows.
63Recall that we assumed no free disposal in Section 2.
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Example 4. Consider the following two policies.
Policy B1
y \ z 1 3
1 u = 2 u = 30
3 u = 20 u = 26
Policy B2
y \ z 1 3
1 u = 1 u = 29
3 u = 25 u = 29
One computes WminM(B1) = 16 > WminM(B2) = 15, whereas WM min(B1) = 14 <
WM min(B2) = 15. One sees that WM min prefers B2, even though it worsens the oppor-
tunities of the worst-oﬀ group, y = 1, and hurts the worst-oﬀ among the worst-oﬀ. This
paradox occurs because the mean-of-mins criterion may seek to improve the situation of
high eﬀort agents even when they belong to well-oﬀ groups of talents, just because they
happen to have the (relatively) smallest outcome in their subgroup of eﬀort level.
Ooghe, Schokkaert and Van de gaer (2003) have provided axiomatic characterizations
of (leximin versions of) WminM and WM min which clarify the ethical underpinnings of
these criteria.64 Their framework deals with matrices (uyz)y∈Y,z∈Z , as defined above. The
domain D of such matrices is the unrestricted domain RY Z. Let DY the subdomain of D
such that uyz = uyz0 for all y, z, z0 (flat reward for all talents, eﬀort has no eﬀect); and DZ
the subdomain of D such that uyz = uy0z for all y, y0, z (equal prospects for all talents,
talent has no eﬀect). The problem is to find a complete ordering R over the domain D.
They focus on the particular case when pypz = py0pz0 for all y, y0, z, z0 (i.e. each component
of the matrix (uyz)y∈Y,z∈Z represents the same number of individuals) –this simplifies the
formulation and justification of permutation axioms presented below.65
The leximin extensions of the min-of-means and mean-of-mins criteria are defined as
follows:
Leximin of Means (RLminM):
∀u, v ∈ D, u R v if and only ifÃX
z∈Z
pzuyz
!
y∈Y
≥lex
ÃX
z∈Z
pzvyz
!
y∈Y
.
Mean of Leximins (RLM min):
∀u, v ∈ D, u R v if and only ifÃX
z∈Z
pzu(y)z
!
y∈Y
≥lex
ÃX
z∈Z
pzv(y)z
!
y∈Y
,
where
¡
u(y)z
¢
y∈Y is a reranked uz such that u(1)z ≤ u(2)z ≤ ...
64Ooghe and Lauwers (2003) also provide a slightly diﬀerent axiomatization of a leximin version of
WM min.
65With a finite number of individuals and an independent distribution of y and z, a matrix with cells
of unequal population sizes can always be expanded into a matrix with one individual in each cell (some
columns may have the same value of z, and some lines the same value of y). Therefore it is not really
restrictive to consider matrices with the same number of individuals for each cell.
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Let us briefly introduce their main axioms. There is a standard Strong Pareto axiom,
satisfied by both orderings.66
Strong Pareto:
∀u, v ∈ D,
u ≥ v ⇒ u R v; u > v ⇒ u P v.
They obtain the utilitarian feature of these orderings by an axiom of translation-scale
invariance saying that changing uyz into uyz + wz for an arbitrary vector (wz)z∈Z does
not change the ranking of matrices. This kind of axiom is common in characterizations
of utilitarianism (see e.g. Bossert and Weymark 2004).
Translation-Scale Invariance in z (Ooghe et al. 2003)
∀u, v ∈ D, ∀w ∈ DZ ,
u R v ⇔ u+ w R v + w.
Both orderings also satisfy the following egalitarian axiom, which embodies the com-
pensation principle in a mild way. It says that when a type of talent has prospects which
dominate another, it is not bad to reduce the gap between them.
Dominance Compensation (Ooghe et al. 2003):
∀u, v ∈ D, ∀y, y0 ∈ Y,
vy > uy ≥ uy0 > vy0
∀y00 6= y, y0, uy00 = vy00
¾
⇒ u R v.
We now introduce permutation axioms, referred to as “Suppes indiﬀerence”. The
first two are rather weak and permute the prospects of talents and the achievements of
eﬀort. They are satisfied by both orderings. The first axiom simply permutes the whole
opportunities of the various talents.
Suppes Indiﬀerence for Talent (Ooghe et al. 2003):
∀u, v ∈ D, ∀σ permutation on Y,
∀y, vy = uσ(y) ⇒ u I v.
The second axiom is more complex and applies diﬀerent permutations of outcomes for dif-
ferent y subgroups, but it does so only for matrices in which prospects for diﬀerent talents
are dominated, i.e. for any y, y0, uy ≤ uy0 or uy ≥ uy0 (before and after permutations).
For such matrices RLminM and RLM min coincide.
Suppes Indiﬀerence for Eﬀort (Ooghe et al. 2003):
∀u, v ∈ D such that ∀y, z, uyz = u(y)z and vyz = v(y)z, ∀ (σy)y∈Y permutations on Z,
∀y, z, vyz = uyσy(z) ⇒ u I v.
The most interesting part of this axiomatic analysis lies in the distinction between the
two orderings, which is deciphered through stronger versions of these axioms performing
separate permutations for every eﬀort level or every talent.
66Hild and Voorhoeve (2004) explain, however, that the mean-of-mins social welfare function may
violate the (weak) Pareto principle when agents change their z in response to policy.
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Strong Suppes Indiﬀerence for Talent (Ooghe et al. 2003):
∀u, v ∈ D, ∀ (σz)z∈Z permutations on Y,
∀y, z, vyz = uσz(y)z ⇒ u I v.
Strong Suppes Indiﬀerence for Eﬀort (Ooghe et al. 2003):
∀u, v ∈ D, ∀ (σy)y∈Y permutations on Z,
∀y, z, vyz = uyσy(z) ⇒ u I v.
These axioms are better explained and critically assessed with examples.
Example 5. The first of these axioms, satisfied by the mean-of-leximins ordering, says
that permuting the outcomes obtained by a subgroup of given eﬀort level does not change
the evaluation. For instance, the following social situations are deemed equivalent, even
though the prospects for the two groups of y are comparable in one case and in clear
domination in the other.
Policy ML1
y \ z 1 3
1 u = 2 u = 30
3 u = 6 u = 26
Policy ML2
y \ z 1 3
1 u = 2 u = 26
3 u = 6 u = 30
In contrast, the leximin-of-means ordering prefers policy ML1.
The second axiom, satisfied by RLminM , says that permuting the outcomes obtained by
a subgroup of given talent does not change the evaluation. For instance, the following
social situations are deemed equivalent, even though the prospects for the two groups of
y are equal in one case and very diﬀerent in the other.
Policy LM1
y \ z 1 3
1 u = 2 u = 30
3 u = 2 u = 30
Policy LM2
y \ z 1 3
1 u = 2 u = 30
3 u = 30 u = 2
In contrast, RLM min strongly prefers policy LM1. In other words, it seems that each of
these axioms deletes a relevant part of information, and as a result each of the orderings
may be criticized for ignoring the respective part.
We may now state the result.
Proposition 17 (Ooghe, Schokkaert, Van de gaer 2003) Let R be a complete ordering
over D, satisfying Strong Pareto, Translation-Scale Invariance in z, and Dominance
Compensation. If, in addition, it satisfies Suppes Indiﬀerence for Talent and Strong
Suppes Indiﬀerence for Eﬀort, then R = RLminM . On the other hand, if in addition, it
satisfies Suppes Indiﬀerence for Eﬀort and Strong Suppes Indiﬀerence for Talent, then
R = RLM min.
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The same authors also study variants of these orderings. For instance, they consider
CES versions, which can be defined as follows.67
WCESminM =
⎛
⎝X
y∈Y
py
ÃX
z∈Z
pz (uyz)
μ
! ρ
μ
⎞
⎠
1
ρ
,
WCESM min =
⎛
⎝X
z∈Z
pz
ÃX
y∈Y
py (uyz)
ρ
!μ
ρ
⎞
⎠
1
μ
.
Hild and Voorhoeve (2004) try to avoid the utilitarian reward and adopt a dominance
criterion which covers various possible reward approaches (although the abstract frame-
work itself makes it impossible to apply the natural reward approach). Their criterion
may be formulated as an axiom, saying that if for every eﬀort level, the observed outcome
distribution is better (according the leximin criterion), then the overall matrix is better.
Opportunity Dominance (Hild and Voorhoeve 2004):
∀u, v ∈ D,
∀z, uz ≥lex vz
∃z, uz >lex vz
¾
⇒ u P v.
This axiom is satisfied by RLM min, but not by R
L
minM , as shown in the following example.
Example 5 (pursued). This axiom imposes to prefer MLL2 to ML1 in the following
example, even though, as in ML1 vs ML2, the prospects for the two groups are comparable
in ML1 and in clear domination in MLL2, as recognized by RLminM .
Policy ML1
y \ z 1 3
1 u = 2 u = 30
3 u = 6 u = 26
Policy MLL2
y \ z 1 3
1 u = 2 u = 27
3 u = 6 u = 30
In other words, the Opportunity Dominance criterion is agnostic about reward but
clearly sides with the mean-of-mins approach and against the min-of-means approach on
whether the evaluation should be on ex ante opportunities for various y or on ex post
inequalities within z subgroups. It can therefore also be criticized for ignoring some
relevant information.
The discussions in Example 5 strongly suggest that it would be better to take ac-
count of the two kinds of considerations (ex ante and ex post), instead of ignoring one
of them totally. Goux and Maurin (2002) address this issue, and propose an interesting
partial criterion, according to which a matrix u is at least as good as another matrix u0 if
WM min(u) ≥ WminM(u0). This criterion itself does not yield the desired strict preference
67Kolm (2001) and Martinez (2004) made similar proposals.
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in the above examples. But their results suggest a refined criterion, according to which a
matrix u is strictly better than u0 if68
WM min(u) > WminM(u0)
or WminM(u) > WM min(u) ≥WminM(u0)
or WM min(u) ≥ WminM(u0) > WM min(u0).
In Example 5, this partial criterion enables us to rank LM1 above LM2, since
WM min(LM1) =WminM(LM2) = 16 > WM min(LM2) = 2;
and ML1 above ML2, since
WminM(ML1) = 16 > WM min(ML1) = 14 =WminM(ML2).
Let us briefly present their axiomatic results underlying this proposal. The domain
they deal with is that of non-negative matrices D = RY Z+ . They rely on a Weak Pareto
axiom.
Weak Pareto:
∀u, v ∈ D,
uÀ v ⇒ u P v.
They use a scale invariance axiom, which is satisfied by both RLminM and RLM min.
Scale Invariance:
∀u, v ∈ D, ∀α ∈ R++,
u R v ⇔ αu R αv.
They also invoke a separability axiom which has to do with decomposing the eﬀect of
talent and eﬀort. It says that if the eﬀect of talent remains the same, a change in the
multiplicative eﬀect of eﬀort does not alter the ranking of two matrices. This axiom is
also satisfied by both RLminM and R
L
M min.
Fixed Eﬀort Eﬀect Separability (Goux and Maurin 2002):
∀u, v, u0, v0 ∈ D, if ∀y, z, uyz = αyβz, vyz = γyβz, u0yz = αyβ0z, v0yz = γyβ0z, then
u R v ⇔ u0 R v0.
The most relevant axiom they introduce is meant to force R to take account of ex ante
prospects and ex post inequalities at the same time, because it says that if prospects are
better for every talent, and outcomes are better for every eﬀort, then the matrix is better
overall.
Talent-Eﬀort Dominance (Goux and Maurin 2002):
∀u, v ∈ D,
∀y ∈ Y,
⎛
⎜⎝
uy
...
uy
⎞
⎟⎠ R
⎛
⎜⎝
vy
...
vy
⎞
⎟⎠
∀z ∈ Z, (uz, ..., uz) R (vz, ..., vz)
⎫
⎪⎪⎪⎬
⎪⎪⎪⎭
⇒ u R v
68Notice that one always has WM min(u) ≤WminM (u).
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(with strict preference in case of strict preference for some i or some j).
This axiom is not satisfied by RLminM , and this can be illustrated by the following
example.
Example 6. Consider the two policies:
Policy LMM1
y \ z 1 3
1 u = 4 u = 18
3 u = 8 u = 14
Policy LMM2
y \ z 1 3
1 u = 2 u = 20
3 u = 10 u = 12
.
The ordering RLminM is indiﬀerent between LMM1 and LMM2. But one sees that
4 18
4 18
ILminM
2 20
2 20
8 14
8 14
ILminM
10 12
10 12
4 4
8 8
PLminM
2 2
10 10
18 18
14 14
PLminM
20 20
12 12
which should imply, by Talent-Eﬀort Dominance, that LMM1 is strictly better, as it
indeed seems obvious, since inequalities ex post are reduced for every level of eﬀort.
Somewhat surprisingly, however, the Talent-Eﬀort Dominance axiom is satisfied by
RLM min, and this suggests that this axiom fails to fully capture the concern for the rele-
vance of ex ante evaluations. In other words, this axiom is compatible with indiﬀerence
between ML1 and ML2, and with Strong Suppes Indiﬀerence for Talent, which appears
questionable. The RLM min ordering is excluded from the theorem below only by an addi-
tional continuity condition.
Proposition 18 (Goux and Maurin 2002, Gajdos and Maurin 2004) If the ordering R,
defined on domain D = RY Z+ , is continuous and satisfies Weak Pareto, Talent-Eﬀort
Dominance and Fixed Eﬀort Eﬀect Separability, then there exist three continuous, in-
creasing, homogeneous functions I : D→ R+, Iy : RY+ → R+ and Iz : RZ+ → R+ such that:
1. I represents R;
2. If Iy (Iz(uy)y∈Y ) = Iz (Iy(uz)z∈Z) then I(u) = Iy (Iz(uy)y∈Y ) ;
3. If Iy (Iz(uy)y∈Y ) 6= Iz (Iy(uz)z∈Z) then I(u) is strictly in between.
Relevant examples of such functions are Iz(uy) =
P
z∈Z pzuyz and Iy(uz) = miny uyz,
yielding
Iy (Iz(uy)y∈Y ) = min
y∈Y
ÃX
z∈Z
pzuyz
!
=WminM(u)
Iz (Iy(uz)z∈Z) =
X
z∈Z
pz
µ
min
y∈Y
uyz
¶
=WM min(u).
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Other examples are Iz(uy) =
¡P
z∈Z pz (uyz)
μ¢ 1μ and Iy(uz) = ³Py∈Y py (uyz)ρ´ 1ρ which
then lead to combining the CES versions of the min-of-means and mean-of-mins social
welfare functions. One limitation of this theorem is that it implies very little about the
functions, and for instance utilitarianism WU does satisfy all the axioms (with related Iy
and Iz which both compute the mean).
Goux and Maurin (2002) emphasize the formal similarity between this issue and the
well-known social choice problem of combining ex ante and ex post social evaluations of
risky prospects.69 Assume that z is unknown ex ante. Then the min-of-means criterion
may be viewed as focusing on ex ante prospects for y subgroups, while the mean-of-mins
criterion focuses on ex post inequalities for various possible realizations of z. From the
literature on risky social choice, a simple combination of the two approaches would simply
add the two criteria:
WC =WminM +WM min.
Whether this can be given a convincing justification in the context of opportunities re-
mains to be seen.70
Mariotti (2003) also exploits the similarity with the risk context in a diﬀerent way, and
examines the particular case in which an opportunity for agent i is defined as a probability
πi of success. In other words, there are only two possible outcomes, success and failure.71
If success is valued a unit (1) and failure is valued zero (0), then πi also measures the
expected value of the outcome for i. In this context, and interpreting i as a talent subgroup
with a proportion πi of success, both RLminM and R
L
M min would apply the leximin to the
π vector. Instead of the leximin criterion, Mariotti advocates the Nash-product criterion
WN = π1. · · · .πn.
He excludes the maximin by requiring the ranking to obey an independence condition.72
5 Related literature
In this section we present some related literature which studies similar issues in diﬀerent
ways, or which applies or extends some of the ideas reviewed above.
69On this problem, see Gajdos and Maurin (2004), Broome (1991), Deschamps and Gevers (1979), Ben
Porath, Gilboa and Schmeidler (1997). The “min-of-means” and “mean-of-mins” terminology used here
is borrowed from this literature.
70There seem to be significant diﬀerences in the two problems. In the risk problem, only one value of z
will eventually be realized, and its determination is outside the agents’ control, whereas in the opportunity
context, all values of z will eventually be observed in the population, and every agent is responsible for
his own value of z. These diﬀerences may limit the transposition of ethical principles from one problem
to the other.
71Vallentyne (2002) adopts a similar probabilistic interpretation of opportunity sets, but with more
than two possible outcomes.
72For two agents, this condition says that if (π1, π2)R (π01, π02) and (π001 , π2)R (π0001 , π02) , then
(απ1 + (1− α)π001 , π2)R (απ01 + (1− α)π0001 , π02) for all 0 < α < 1.
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5.1 Ranking distributions of opportunity sets
In many contexts it is considered that the characteristics that the agents are responsible
for are chosen by them, and that compensating for the non-responsible characteristics is
tantamount to providing agents with “equal opportunities”. As recalled in the introduc-
tion, this is actually the way some philosophers have introduced these general egalitarian
principles.
Thomson (1994) has studied the idea of equal opportunities in the simple fair divi-
sion model, and has made an important distinction between actual opportunities (the
consumed bundle belongs to the opportunity set) and “equivalent” opportunities (the
consumed bundle yields the same satisfaction as the best bundle in the opportunity set).
Kranich (1996) has initiated an important branch of the literature which studies how
to rank distributions of opportunity sets (O1, ..., On), where Oi denotes individual i’s
opportunity set, in terms of inequality. Kranich (1996) characterizes inequality measures
that are linear, such as, in the case of two agents, the absolute value of the cardinality
diﬀerence, |#O1 −#O2| . Kranich (1997a) extends this analysis to opportunity sets which
are not finite, such as compact subsets of the Euclidean space, for instance budget sets in
a market economy. Ok (1997) and Ok and Kranich (1998) analyze the possibility to adapt
the basic results of the theory of income inequality, which connect Lorenz dominance to
Pigou-Dalton transfers, to this new framework where income is replaced by opportunity
sets. They show that the diﬃculty lies in adapting the notion of transfer and their results
suggest that it is hard to avoid relying on cardinality-based evaluations of opportunity sets
if one wants to replicate the classical theorems of income inequality. See also Arlegi and
Nieto (1999) and Weymark (2003), the latter revisiting the results of Kranich (1996) with
a version of the Pigou-Dalton transfer principle that only applies when the opportunity
sets are nested. Other parts of this literature simply assume that there is a given measure
of the value of sets (Herrero 1997 proposes to measure inequality by the diﬀerence between
the greatest and the smallest value of the individual sets in the considered distribution,
Herrero 1996 defines social welfare in terms of capability indices) or a given preordering
over opportunity sets (Herrero, Iturbe-Ormaetxe and Nieto 1998, Bossert, Fleurbaey and
Van de gaer 1999). In particular the last two references provide characterizations of social
preorderings which rank distributions of opportunity sets on the basis of the intersection
of individual sets,
Tn
i=1Oi, a notion that has been already encountered in the above
discussion of the mean-of-mins criterion. This intersection criterion is also axiomatically
defended, in an economic model and in terms of “common capabilities”, by Gotoh and
Yoshihara (1999, 2003).73
The earlier parts of the literature presented in the previous sections seldom explicitly
referred to opportunity sets but, as emphasized by Bossert et al. (1999), it is sometimes
easy to interpret the solutions in terms of equalizing some appropriately defined opportu-
nity sets. One can even argue that this literature provides ethical justifications for specific
and concrete definitions of opportunity sets in economic contexts. Consider for instance
73More detailed surveys of this literature can be found in Peragine (1999), Barbera, Bossert and
Pattanaik (2004).
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the model of Section 2. The Egalitarian Equivalent allocation rule can be interpreted as
equalizing the virtual opportunity sets:
{(x, y) | x ≤ x˜, y = y˜}.
In general, most Egalitarian Equivalent allocation rules can be interpreted as applying
the maximin criterion to “equivalent” opportunity sets that individuals would accept to
choose from. This is clear for instance with the Budget Egalitarian Equivalent rules in
Section 3.
The conditional egalitarian allocation rule, again in the model of Section 2, can be
read in terms of opportunity sets
{(x, y) | x ≤ xi, y = yi}.
and equality is sought between these heterogeneous sets by referring to a particular utility
function u˜ : The value of an opportunity set is the value taken by the indirect utility
function on this set. A similar interpretation can be made of the Conditional Equality
allocation rule in the model of Section 3.
If one refers to the philosophical theories, however, it seems more relevant to define
opportunity sets in terms of pairs (responsibility variable, achievement). This is actually
how we proceeded in Example 1 in the introduction. In the setting of Section 2, this
suggests defining the opportunity set of an agent as:
{(u, u¯) | u ∈ U , u¯ = u(xi, yi)}
or in the quasi-linear case:
{(z, u¯) | z ∈ Z, u¯ = xi + v(yi, z)}.
It might be desirable to take account of the potential dependence of xi on ui (or zi) via the
allocation rule, in these definitions.74 Notice that the conditional egalitarian allocation
rule amounts to equalizing the sections of these opportunity sets taken at u = u˜, or z = z˜.
5.2 Extended insurance
As explained in Subsections 2.2 and 3.2, the No-Envy condition is too demanding in
the context of compensation for non-transferable internal resources, because it is often
impossible to find allocations satisfying it. Whereas most of the economic literature tried
to escape this diﬃculty by imagining weaker requirements, Dworkin (1981b) suggested to
retain the No-Envy condition but to apply it to a modified framework, namely, imagining
a hypothetical insurance market in which agents could insure themselves, ex ante, against
the prospect of ending up with a handicap. No-Envy could easily be satisfied ex ante by
74But then one runs into the following problem. In a small economy, the opportunities for a given agent
depend on the values of the responsibility variables chosen by the other agents, so that opportunities
become interdependent and there is no way to define them ex ante. See Kolm (1993), Fleurbaey (1995b),
Barbera et al. (2004) for brief explorations of this matter.
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granting all agents the same income in this hypothetical market. Ex post, the resource
transfers performed between agents would just reflect their free choices of insurance.
Obviously, this extended insurance market would have to operate under a veil of ignorance,
the agents ignoring their personal talents.75 A similar device was considered by Kolm
(1985), and it is rather natural to consider that the extended insurance is just an extension
of ordinary insurance markets and social insurance schemes, in the direction of increasing
the scope of redistribution from the “lucky” toward the “unlucky”.
Roemer (1985a) showed that this intuition is likely to be incorrect, and provided sev-
eral examples showing that an extended insurance may behave like ordinary utilitarianism
and entail the same paradoxical anti-redistribution from the unlucky (handicapped) to
the lucky (talented).76 The reason for this paradox is simple. First, an agent who max-
imizes his expected utility ex ante is doing a similar formal computation as a utilitarian
planner maximizing a weighted sum of utilities. Insurance markets therefore generally
produce results which bear a close relationship to a utilitarian allocation of resources.
When agents have similar utility functions, with decreasing marginal utility of income,
utilitarianism produces egalitarian consequences in the allocation of resources. Similarly,
insurance against ordinary damages which reduce income or wealth enables agents to
transfer resources from the states where they are rich to the states where they are poor.
Now, contrary to ordinary damages, personal talents typically alter utility functions.
When describing agents in an extended insurance market, one then has to deal with state-
dependent utility functions. In such a market, if a damage (low talent, handicap) reduces
the marginal utility of income, then agents will typically want to transfer resources from
states with damage toward states without damage, and will therefore want to insure
against the more favorable state, in order to obtain more resources in this state, thereby
sacrificing their welfare in the unlucky state.
As Roemer shows, in the case of extended insurance for production skills, one also
gets unpalatable consequences. We have seen above that when all agents have the same
utility functions, the principle of compensation calls for an equalization of utility levels.
This will generally not happen with the extended insurance market, precisely for the same
reason which leads a utilitarian planner to choose allocations with unequal utility levels
in such a case.77
75Unlike Rawls’s veil of ignorance, the agents would know their preferences and ambitions. Someone
with musical ambitions, for instance, could then take a special insurance against short fingers or unperfect
pitch. The fact that preferences are often influenced by actual talents makes Dworkin consider the
possibility of having agents know their talents but still ignore the market value of their talents.
76In addition, it is not obvious that the hypothetical choices made in a virtual ex ante state are
relevant to justify transfers of resources between individuals who have never lived in this ex ante state.
Consider someone who belongs to the unlucky two percent of the population with a genetic disease. Is it
an acceptable consolation for him to be told that, if given the possibility, he would have taken the two
percent risk of getting those bad genes and ending up with his current share of resources? It is far from
clear that trade-oﬀs made by an individual over his possible future selves are relevant to trading-oﬀ the
conflicting interests of separate individuals who have to share resources. See Kolm (1996b, 1998).
77More recent discussions of the extended insurance scheme can be found in Kolm (1996b, 1998),
Roemer (1996, 2002a), Fleurbaey (2002), Dworkin (2002).
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5.3 Extended sympathy and interpersonal comparisons of util-
ity
The notion of envy-freeness that is central to the approach presented in this chapter can
be considered as intermediate between ordinary envy-freeness, which bears only on exter-
nal resources, and a more extensive egalitarian criterion which encompasses all personal
characteristics and essentially seeks equality of utilities. This range of possibilities was
identified by Kolm (1972), and more recently the same author (Kolm 1996a,b) argued
that the location of the cut between characteristics submitted to compensation and other
characteristics is a central feature of various theories of justice. More precisely, assume
that individual utility is a function ofm personal characteristics: ui(xi, θi1, ..., θim). Decid-
ing to compensate for the first k characteristics can be enforced for instance by applying
the No-Envy test in the following way:
ui(xi, θi1, ..., θik, θik+1, ..., θim) ≥ ui(xj, θj1, ..., θjk, θik+1, ..., θim).
Notice that, as shown in the previous section, this general scheme is also relevant for such
characteristics as productive skills, which are not a direct argument of the ordinary utility
function, but are an argument of a suitably defined utility function.
This generalized envy test seems to introduce a kind of interpersonal comparison
of utility, although, as stressed in Section 2, it is perfectly immune to any increasing
transformation of the individual utility functions. Only ordinal preferences over vectors
of “extended resources” (x, θ1, ..., θk) do matter. When all characteristics are subject
to compensation, the No-Envy test reads like equalizing utilities if the individual utility
functions are identical and interpersonally comparable, that is, if there is a unique function
u(xi, θi1, ..., θim) that describes all individuals’ utilities in an interpersonally comparable
way.
A related notion is that of extended sympathy, and a joint use of the concepts of
extended sympathy and No-Envy has been made in particular by Suzumura (1981a,b,
1983). In the extended sympathy framework, every individual is endowed with preferences
over extended pairs (x, i), where x describes the social alternative (say, an allocation) and
i is the name of an individual. In order to compare this with our formalism, assume
that every agent has a utility function vi(xj, j), where xj is simply agent j’s consumption
(preferences are self-centered). With this convention, the No-Envy test as applied by
Suzumura corresponds to
vi(xi, i) ≥ vi(xj, j).
This suggests that it is equivalent to the test
ui(xi, θi1, ..., θik, θik+1, ..., θim) ≥ ui(xj, θj1, ..., θjk, θik+1, ..., θim)
if in vi(xj, j), the second argument depends only on (θj1, ..., θjk), and if the shape of the
function vi is molded by (θik+1, ..., θim). Therefore the extended sympathy framework is
equivalent to ours, albeit with a less explicit description of individual characteristics.
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But there remains an important diﬀerence. A standard axiom, which is often relied
upon in the extended sympathy framework, is the Axiom of Identity, meaning that every
agent’s extended preferences respects others’ tastes over ordinary resources:
Axiom of Identity (Sen 1970):
∀i, j ∈ N, ∀x, x0, vi(x, j) ≥ vi(x0, j)⇔ vj(x, j) ≥ vj(x0, j).
Translated into our notations, this axiom would mean
ui(x, θj1, ..., θjk, θik+1, ..., θim) ≥ ui(x0, θj1, ..., θjk, θik+1, ..., θim)⇔
uj(x, θj1, ..., θjk, θjk+1, ..., θjm) ≥ uj(x0, θj1, ..., θjk, θjk+1, ..., θjm),
and it is clear that this condition has little appeal in our framework,78 even if we assume
that ui = uj, since the diﬀerence between characteristics (θik+1, ..., θim) and (θjk+1, ..., θjm)
may plausibly entail diﬀerent preferences over x. For instance, in the production model of
Section 3, the Axiom of Identity would require that all agents have identical preferences
over (c, c). Indeed, for this model the equivalence in the Axiom of Identity translates into
ui(cˆ/sj, c) ≥ ui(cˆ0/sj, c0)⇔ uj(cˆ/sj, c) ≥ uj(cˆ0/sj, c0),
or equivalently,
ui(c, c) ≥ ui(c0, c0)⇔ uj(c, c) ≥ uj(c0, c0).
The Axiom of Identity seems reasonable only in the case when all characteristics
are subject to compensation. Therefore it is probably a safer reading of the extended
sympathy approach that it usually deals with the extreme case of full compensation for
all individual characteristics.
5.4 Bargaining
Yoshihara (2003) studies a variant of the production model of Section 3, with several goods
being produced with unequal skills, and focuses on bargaining solutions (which, unlike al-
location rules, select a single utility vector for any given utility possibility set). He provides
characterizations of three bargaining solutions (egalitarian, Nash, Kalai-Smorodinsky) and
highlights the interpretation of some of the axioms in terms of responsibility and compen-
sation. Unlike the solutions presented above, the bargaining solutions violate Ordinalism
and rely on utility figures. However, the Nash and Kalai-Smorodinsky solutions do ex-
hibit some independence with respect to rescaling of utilities, which can be interpreted
as reflecting some ascription of responsibility to individuals for their utility functions.
Conversely, the egalitarian solution satisfies stronger solidarity properties (such as Skill
Solidarity). Yoshihara shows that no bargaining solution satisfies Skill Solidarity and an
independence axiom with respect to utility rescaling, in addition to Pareto eﬃciency and
Equal Treatment of Equals. Since the Egalitarian-Equivalent allocation rule SEE satisfies
all of these axioms, this suggests that bargaining solutions suﬀer from a stronger dilemma
between compensation and responsibility than allocation rules.
78Except, trivially, when x is one-dimensional, as in Section 2.
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5.5 Surplus-sharing and cost-sharing approach
The literature presented in Section 3 studies allocation rules which define a subset of
first best allocations for every economy, or social ordering functions which rank all allo-
cations. Another interesting object is a surplus-sharing rule, which defines a sharing of
the product for any vector of input contributions. More precisely, consider an economy
e = (sN , uN , f) ∈ E . A surplus-sharing rule is a function ψ : [0, c]n → Rn+ such that for
all cN ∈ [0, c]n,
nX
i=1
ψi(cN) = f
ÃX
i∈N
sici
!
.
A surplus-sharing rule defines a game form, in which input contributions are the strategies,
and consumptions (paired with input contributions) are the payoﬀs.
Kranich (1994) studies how to make the rule ψ perform some kind of compensation
by considering the following axiom:
Equal Share for Equal Work (Kranich 1994):
∀cN ∈ [0, c]n, ∀i, j ∈ N,
ci = cj ⇒ ψi(cN) = ψj(cN).
He studies the case of a two-person economy, and gives suﬃcient conditions for a
Pareto-eﬃcient allocation to be obtainable as a Nash equilibrium of the game defined
by a surplus-sharing rule satisfying Equal Share for Equal Work. Notice that in this
result the choice of the surplus-sharing rule must be tailored to the particular profile of
preferences in the economy.
Gotoh and Yoshihara (1999, 2003) study a variant of the same model in which leisure
and consumption are used by the agents in order to construct capability sets. In their
model the agents have diﬀerent productive skills but also diﬀerent skills in the making of
capability sets. These authors rely on compensation axioms similar to Equal Share for
Equal Work, and on axioms of solidarity with respect to changes in input contributions
and changes in capability skills, in order to characterize a family of surplus-sharing rules
that maximizes the (appropriately defined) value of the common capability set of the
agents.79
Moulin and Sprumont (2002) study the cost-sharing problem, which is dual to the
surplus-sharing problem and consists in choosing a function φ : Rn+ → Rn+ such that for
all cN ∈ Rn+,
nX
i=1
φi(cN) = C (cN) ,
where C : Rn+ → R+ is a cost function. The problem of compensation may arise in this
setting when the cost function is asymmetric in the individuals demands ci (some individ-
uals are more costly to serve than others), and one considers that agents are responsible
for the quantities demanded but not for the fact that serving them is more or less costly.
79Extending this analysis, Gotoh, Suzumura and Yoshihara (2005) study the construction of extended
social ordering functions which rank pairs of game forms and allocations on the basis of principles of
procedural fairness, capability egalitarianism, and eﬃciency.
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Moulin and Sprumont study the following axiom, whose connection with the principle of
compensation and Equal Utility for Equal Function is quite transparent:
Strong Ranking (Moulin and Sprumont 2002):
∀cN ∈ Rn+, ∀i, j ∈ N,
ci ≥ cj ⇒ φi(cN) ≥ φj(cN).
In particular, this axiom entails that when two agents formulate the same demand,
they pay the same share, irrespectively of the diﬀerential cost induced by their demands.
This equity principle is actually a cornerstone of the pricing policy of some public mo-
nopolies (post services for instance).
Focusing on the case of demands expressed in discrete units (ci ∈ N), Moulin and
Sprumont show that many reasonable sharing rules satisfy this axiom, but their axiomatic
analysis singles out the cross-subsidizing serial method defined as follows, when individuals
are re-ranked so that c1 ≤ ... ≤ cn:
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
φ1(cN) =
1
nC(c1, ..., c1)
φ2(cN) = φ1(cN) +
1
n−1 [C(c1, c2, ..., c2)− C(c1, ..., c1)]
...
φi(cN) = φi−1(cN) +
1
n−i+1 [C(c1, c2, ..., ci, ..., ci)− C(c1, c2, ..., ci−1, ..., ci−1)] .
To the best of our knowledge, these three works are the only exceptions to a rather
intriguing general neglect of the compensation problem in the surplus-sharing and cost-
sharing literature. The tradition in this literature is to assign full responsibility to the
agents for their demands and for the induced cost. This is expressed in particular in a
dummy axiom, according to which any agent i who generates no cost (the cost function
is constant with respect to yi) should pay nothing. This axiom is incompatible with the
Strong Ranking (SR) axiom. For a general survey of the cost sharing literature, see
Moulin (2002).
5.6 Opinions
Although the layman should not necessarily dictate the exact list of equity principles that
ought to be studied in political philosophy and in normative economics, it is nonetheless
interesting to submit our axioms to the test of questionnaires in which simple situations
are presented to uninformed people in order to see what basic principles are spontaneously
accepted or rejected.
A number of empirical works have to do with the ethical principles mentioned here.
First, the classical paper by Yaari and Bar-Hillel (1984) is well known as showing that
the traditional welfarist solutions perform badly because diﬀerent contexts seem to call
for diﬀerent choices of allocation rules. It turns out the principles of compensation and of
natural reward provide a simple explanation of the pattern of answers in that work. Let
us briefly recall the setting. A bundle of two goods (x1, x2) = (12, 12) has to be shared
between Jones, whose utility function is uJ(x1, x2) = 100x1, and Smith, whose utility
function is uS(x1, x2) = 20x1+20x2. The main result obtained by Yaari and Bar-Hillel is
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that when the utility function describes the nutritional metabolism of the individuals, the
answers are mostly in favor of the allocation (4, 0) for Jones, (8, 12) for Smith, which yields
equal utilities, whereas when it is a matter of tastes, the answers shift to the allocation
(12, 0) for Jones, (0, 12) for Smith, which corresponds to either utilitarianism, the Nash
bargaining solution or the equal-income Walrasian equilibrium.
Now, suppose that individuals are not deemed responsible for their metabolism but
are deemed responsible for their tastes. When they are not responsible for the diﬀerence
in the utility functions, then application of the compensation principle requires equalizing
the utilities. When they are responsible for the diﬀerence, then the principle of natural
reward would be satisfied by applying the equal-income Walrasian equilibrium. The an-
swers are perfectly compatible with this pattern. They are also compatible with adopting
a utilitarian reward in the latter case.
The simple examples in this case involve only two agents and therefore do not raise the
issue of the incompatibility between compensation and natural reward, or between com-
pensation and utilitarian reward. The first incompatibility has been studied by Schokkaert
and Devooght (1998). They study examples in the quasi-linear case. In the first subcase,
the function is separable in the two parameters y and z (resp., non-responsible and respon-
sible parameters): v(y, z) = 50y + 150z, while in the second subcase it is not separable:
v(y, z) = 200y + 150z + 100yz. Two diﬀerent contexts are proposed to the respondents,
each with four individuals. The first one deals with health expenditures (y describes med-
ical needs, z describes choosing an expensive doctor), and the second one with income
redistribution (y is an innate talent, z measures eﬀort). In the context of health expendi-
tures, and in the separable subcase, the answers are very much in favor of application of
the “canonical” allocation rule (which, as described in Section 2, coincides in the separable
case with the main allocation rules)
xi = −50yi +
1
4
4X
j=1
50yj,
while in the non-separable subcase, the respondents tend to favor allocations respecting
the natural reward principle (more precisely, theEqualResource for Equal Talent axiom),
at the expense of compensation.80
In the context of income redistribution, the answers are much less attuned to the
compensation and natural reward principles, and show an exaggerated willingness to
reward less talented agents who make a high eﬀort and to punish more talented agents
who exert little eﬀort, but may also be interpreted as expressing a desire to maintain a
remuneration of talent itself, especially under eﬀort. One may suspect that respondents
bring in incentive considerations which are absent in the model of Subsection 2.4.
80An experimental analysis about dental expenditures has also been made by Clement and Serra (2001),
and similarly shows some acceptance of the idea of responsibility. See also Schokkaert and Devooght
(2003) for an international comparison of opinions on compensation and responsibility.
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5.7 Applications
Applications of social ordering functions and social welfare functions to the design of
optimal income tax have been numerous. The setting is the classical optimal taxation
problem, as formulated by Mirrlees (1971). Assuming the planner knows the distribution
of types (skills and preferences) in the population, but does not observe individuals’ types,
they study income tax schemes leading to allocations that maximize a social ordering
function, under the usual incentive compatibility constraints (these constraints amount
here to letting agents freely choose their labor time on the budget set defined by the tax
scheme). Bossert, Fleurbaey and Van de gaer (1999) and Fleurbaey and Maniquet (1998,
2001, 2002) use the social ordering functions introduced in Section 3, and a few others of
a similar kind. Roemer (1998), Roemer et alii (2000), Vandenbroucke (2001), Schokkaert,
Van de gaer, Vandenbroucke and Luttens (2004) rely on various versions of the min-of-
means and mean-of-mins social welfare functions. van der Veen (2004) directly compares
budget sets, viewed as opportunity sets. Most of these works focus on the linear tax,
with the exception of the papers by Fleurbaey and Maniquet.81 Vandenbroucke (2001)
and van der Veen (2004) consider the combination of labor subsidies with income tax.
In a diﬀerent vein, the implementation problem (in which the planner does not know
the distribution of types) for economies with unequal skills is studied in Yamada and
Yoshihara (2004).
Under richness assumptions on the distribution of types (in particular, the small-
est skill is 0), and considering non-linear taxes, Fleurbaey and Maniquet (1998) show
that maximizing any social ordering functions satisfying Weak Pareto82 and Hammond
Compensation entails maximizing the minimum income.83 On the other hand, the tax
scheme obtained by maximization of a Conditional Equality ordering function RΦCE de-
pends on the choice of the reference function u˜. For some u˜ (corresponding to hard-
working preferences), the result is, again, to maximize the minimum income. This shows
that the compensation-natural reward conflict may disappear in second-best problems, in
the sense that diﬀerent social objectives based on these two principles may lead to the
same allocations.84 However, Fleurbaey and Maniquet (2001, 2002) show that when the
minimum wage is positive, a slight dose of natural reward in social ordering functions
81In a related work, Boadway et al. (2002) study an ordinary weighted utilitarian objective on the
same model, considering various possible weights for agents with diﬀerent utility functions, with the idea
of spanning diverse reward principles.
82Weak Pareto requires an allocation to be socially preferred if it is preferred by all agents to another
allocation.
83An analysis of the basic income proposal in terms of similar considerations is made in Gotoh and
Yoshihara (2004).
84Another connection between the taxation setting and the ethical principles deserves to be noted.
Recall that in the study of allocation rules, a link between incentive conditions (Independence of Utilities,
Monotonicity) and natural reward axioms already suggested a congruence, noted above, between natural
reward and incentives. Similarly, in a context of taxation, it appears that the allocations which are
achievable under incentive constraints do satisfy significant features of natural reward. For instance,
in the linear version of the model of Section 3 (domain EL), all allocations which are achievable by a
redistributive tax on earnings sici do satisfy No-Envy among Equally Skilled, because agents with equal
skills automatically have the same budget set in this setting.
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based on compensation leads to the conclusion that the marginal tax rate for incomes
below the minimum wage must be zero or even negative on average. The reason is that
the social ordering function then advocates maximization of the net income of agents who
work full time at the minimum wage (the working poor).
Roemer et al. (2000) and Vandenbroucke (2001) study the application of the mean-
of-mins and/or min-of-means criteria, with a measure of individual “advantage” u(x, y, z)
which is objective. For instance, in a study of various Western countries with the purpose
of comparing actual tax rates with the optimal tax rate for Roemer’s criterion, Roemer
et al. (2000) take individual advantage to be the logarithm85 of income, disregarding the
disutility of labor. The idea is to measure inequalities of opportunity for income. But with
such an objective approach, they obtain the possibility of choosing linear taxes which are
Pareto-ineﬃcient (tax rates beyond 80% are advocated in this paper for some European
countries). Schokkaert et al. (2004) make a thorough comparison of the results obtained
with various objective and subjective measures of individual utility, and with the two
social welfare functions. They show in particular that mean-of-mins generally leads to
higher tax rates than min-of-means. Vandenbroucke (2001) shows that the results are
bound to change substantially when the possibility of subsidizing labor (assuming labor
hours are observable) at a fixed rate is introduced in supplement to the linear income tax.
Under the specific assumptions on the distribution of skills and on agents’ utility func-
tions used by Roemer (1998), Bossert, Fleurbaey and Van de gaer (1999) compute the
optimal linear tax associated to diﬀerent social ordering functions, including those pre-
sented in Section 3,86 as well as the min-of-means and mean-of-mins social welfare func-
tions (with a subjective measure of individual utility, avoiding Pareto-ineﬃcient results).
Their result is that the highest income tax rate, and therefore the largest redistribution,
follows from maximizing the Egalitarian Equivalent ordering function REE.
Kranich (1997b) studies a slightly diﬀerent model where tax revenues are used by
the government to finance education policies. An education policy consists of allocating
diﬀerent amounts of money to the schooling of agents, thereby enhancing their ability to
earn income. Under several assumptions (in particular the assumption that each agent
is capable of achieving any earning ability level ex post), this model has the interest-
ing feature that, under complete information, an education policy exists such that the
resulting Pareto-eﬃcient allocation satisfies both Equal Utility for Equal Function and
Equal Resource for Equal Talent. Kranich proves, however, that even in this context but
under incomplete information, information/incentive constraints also prevent the planner
from achieving full compensation, so that Equal Utility for Equal Function is no longer
achievable. This negative outcome also holds, obviously, in ordinary taxation models.
In Roemer (1998, 2002), an empirical computation of the mean-of-mins criterion is
made for the allocation of educational resources in the USA, considering only race as a
non-responsible parameter, and measuring the achievement of individuals by the logarithm
of earnings, econometrically estimated as a function of educational resources and “eﬀort”
85Recall that these criteria do not satisfy Ordinalism and are sensitive to the particular cardinal utility
function adopted to measure individual outcomes.
86Actually, they use a diﬀerent variant of Conditional Equality.
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(measured by the percentile of the number of years of attendance in a subgroup of agents
with the same race and similar amount of educational resources –see below). Policy is
described simply by two instruments, the average amount of educational resources given
to each of the two types of pupils. The optimal allocation of resources obtained by this
computation implies a high transfer since resources devoted to black pupils should be
about ten times as much as resources allotted to white pupils. Llavador and Roemer
(2001) also apply the same criterion to the issue of the allocation of international aid
across countries.
Roemer (1993, 1998) also makes a specific proposal about how to construct a measure
of a responsibility variable for a given population. First the variables representing talent
have to be chosen, and by sample surveys or any statistical means the joint distribution
of the talent variables and the other characteristics that influence people’s outcomes must
be estimated. Then two agents in the population are considered as identical in terms
of “responsibility” (or “eﬀort”) if their other characteristics are at the same percentile
of the conditional distribution of these characteristics in the respective class of talent of
these two agents. Of course, this method essentially requires that the other characteristics
can be ranked on the real line and are a monotonic function of the underlying “eﬀort”
variable that one tries to estimate.87 An interesting consequence of this method is that
the distribution of the responsibility variable is then automatically independent of talent.
This method has been applied by Van de gaer, Martinez and Schokkaert (2001) in order
to define new measures of social mobility. The idea is that social mobility can be viewed
as congruent to equality of opportunities, when opportunities are measured on the basis
of the conditional distribution of a given generation’s outcomes (e.g. income), for a given
level of parental outcome. Similarly, O’Neill, Sweetman and Van de gaer (2000) make
a non-parametric estimation of the distribution of the earnings in the USA, conditional
on parental earnings88. They draw “opportunity sets” by representing the graph of the
inverse of the cumulative distribution function, which tells the income obtained at any
percentile in this distribution. In their analysis the only non-responsible variable that
serves to compute the conditional distribution is parental income. Their results show
that diﬀerent parents’ incomes entail unequal opportunities to achieve a given income.
For instance, the same level of income is obtained by children of poor families who are
at the 65th percentile of their conditional distribution, but is obtained by children of rich
families who are only at the 40th percentile of their conditional distribution.89
A diﬀerent empirical application of the axioms of compensation has been made by
Schokkaert, Dhaene and Van de Voorde (1998) and Schokkaert and Van de Voorde (2004).
It deals with the joint management of health insurance agencies (such as the allocation
of budget allowances to regional mutual insurances in Belgium). A basic distinction is
87For a discussion of assumptions underlying this method, see Fleurbaey (1998), Roemer (1998, 2002),
Kolm (2001), Hild and Voorhoeve (2004).
88See Lefranc, Pistolesi and Trannoy (2003) for similar applications to French data and Goux and
Maurin (2002) for an application combining the Van de gaer and Roemer criteria.
89For a general comparison of mobility measures with measures based on the idea of equal opportunities,
see Van de gaer, Martinez and Schokkaert (2001), Schluter and Van de gaer (2002). See also Roemer
(2004) and Fields et al. (2005).
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made, in the set of variables explaining the level of medical expenditures, between those
for which the insurer should be held responsible, and those which do elicit compensation.
Compensation in this setting has implications in terms of incentives for risk selection:
Full compensation should prevent insurers from selecting among their potential customers
those who display favorable risks. Natural reward, on the other hand, has a direct eﬀect
on incentives for eﬃcient management of resources. Therefore the axioms of compensa-
tion and natural reward seem relevant in this application, albeit with a reinterpretation.
The authors show how to rely on an econometric estimation of the equations of medical
expenditures in order to choose the allocation rule for the global budget. They discuss
the problem of possible non-separability of the exogenous variables in the equation, and
show the unavoidable ethical choices that must be made by the public decision-maker in
this respect.
A similar kind of application has been made, for the problem of interregional budget
transfers, by Cappelen and Tungodden (2003a).90 The idea is that regions are responsible
for their policy, in particular their tax rate, but not for characteristics of the region
influencing the tax base. They show that two prominent transfer schemes in the fiscal
federalism literature, namely the foundation grant and the power equalization grant, can
be related to conditional equality and egalitarian-equivalence, respectively. Calsamiglia
(2004) studies how policies which attempt to achieve equality of opportunity separately
in various sectors of individual life (e.g. health, labor market, education) may ultimately
achieve equality of opportunity globally. She shows that, for some contexts, this obtains
if and only if rewards to eﬀort are equalized across individuals in each sector.
6 Conclusion
Let us put the various approaches described in this chapter in perspective. One of the
lessons from the surveyed literature is that anyone who embarks in social evaluations in
the compensation-responsibility context must make two key decisions: 1) How should
responsibility be rewarded (the two prominent options being liberal neutrality –natural
reward– or zero inequality aversion –utilitarian reward)? 2) Is compensation or reward
the priority? This second question is inseparable from, and in some contexts equivalent
to, a third one: Is the focus on ex post inequalities or on ex ante prospects? The fol-
lowing table places the main evaluation criteria which have been presented above in their
respective positions with respect to these questions.
Natural reward Utilitarian reward
Priority on compensation (ex post) egalitarian-equivalent mean-of-mins
Priority on reward (ex ante) conditional equality min-of-means
In the rest of this conclusion, we highlight a few open questions. The distinction
between various reward principles is not clearly made in many parts of the literature,
some authors spontaneously adopting a natural reward approach while other authors
90This is also the main motivating topic in Iturbe and Nieto (1996).
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choose a utilitarian reward without much reflection. Initially, the diﬀerent approaches
were linked to the fact that some authors studied allocation rules and Pareto-eﬃcient
redistribution, while other authors, interested in inequality measurement and dominance
analysis or in taxation and redistribution under incentive constraints, looked for social
welfare functions and therefore took welfarist social welfare functions as their point of
departure. In the theory of fair allocation rules, the Walrasian equilibrium and the general
idea of equality of resources (as expressed e.g. in the No-Envy condition) are absolutely
pre-eminent, and this led authors toward natural reward. In contrast, the theory of social
welfare functions identifies neutrality about welfare inequalities with a zero inequality
aversion as displayed by a utilitarian social welfare function. Now that social welfare
functions embodying natural reward and geared toward Walrasian allocations have been
produced,91 such as the Conditional Equality ordering function RΦCE (see Subsection 3.2),
it is possible to compare natural reward and utilitarian reward not only in the field of
first-best redistribution, but also in the field of second-best redistribution. A preliminary
comparative study is made in Bossert, Fleurbaey and Van de gaer (1999), but a general
confrontation between natural reward and utilitarian reward remains to be done.
Propositions 3 and 4 in Subsection 2.3 are typical of many results in this literature,
in which a family of allocation rules (or social ordering functions) is characterized, but
this family contains an infinity of very diﬀerent solutions, which diﬀer by some crucial
parameter (such as y˜ or u˜). The choice of a precise member in such a family presumably
requires invoking additional ethical principles, such as more precise reward principles92
or totally diﬀerent notions. For instance, self-ownership as studied in Subsection 3.4 was
shown to restrict the range of admissible parameters. But a theory about the choice of the
reference parameters remains to be elaborated. In addition, it is rather disturbing when
the Consistency axiom forces solutions to stick to one and the same reference parameter
whatever the profile of the population. It would seem more sensible to have the reference
parameter depend on the profile, and this has been shown to be important in order to
satisfy some compensation or natural reward axioms (e.g. it is necessary, as stated in
Proposition 2, that Φ be idempotent so that SΦCE may satisfy Equal Utility for Uniform
Function). There exist alternative solutions, such that the average rules SAEE, SACE or
the balanced rules SBE, SBCE presented in Subsections 2.2 or 2.4.1. But such solutions
have their limitations, since they can be computed only in special contexts (and their
characterizations rely either on contrived axioms or on special domain assumptions).
More generally, we conjecture that in the future a more refined theory will make a
distinction between diﬀerent contexts. For instance, in u(x, y, z), z may be an eﬀort or
merit variable, or simply a taste parameter, and the discussions of Examples 2 and 3
91A general study of the construction of social ordering functions which are oriented toward equalizing
resources and only rely on individual ordinal non-comparable preferences is made in Fleurbaey and
Maniquet (1996b), in relation to the theory of allocation rules and also in relation to the presumed
impossibility of social choice without interpersonal comparisons of utility.
92For instance, Tungodden (2005) argues in favor of the flattest (most egalitarian) reward, advocating
a particular SΨEE rule. In the production model, Fleurbaey and Maniquet (2005) give related arguments
in favor of REE (and an ordering function rationalizing SΨEE in EL, with Ψ(wsN ) = wmini si), which
can also be interpreted as the most egalitarian in a similar sense.
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have shown that moral intuition may be sensitive to this. Moreover, Examples 1 through
3 rely on diﬀerent utility functions. In Example 1, x and y are perfect substitutes,
which makes the principle of compensation and the principle of natural reward not only
compatible, but also equally attractive. Example 2, in which agents are totally responsible
for their sensitivity to transfers, has been chosen to criticize the principle of compensation.
Example 3, in which talent, but not transfers, aﬀects the productivity of eﬀort, was cooked
to criticize the principle of natural reward. The shape of the utility function may then be
relevant to the choice of ethical principles.
Another drawback of all the solutions which are not direct extensions of the No-Envy
allocation rule SNE is that they may fail to select envy-free allocations when some exist. In
other words, axioms like Equal Utility for Equal Function and Equal Resource for Equal
Talent (or No-Envy among Equally Skilled) are too weak to guarantee that whenever
envy-free (and Pareto-eﬃcient) allocations exist, some of them must be selected. On
the other hand, the direct extensions of SNE presented in Subsection 2.2 do not have
clear ethical properties in terms of compensation and reward outside the subdomain of
economies in whichNo-Envy can be satisfied (although Prop. 2 above does provide some
answers), and do not have any axiomatic justification. In brief, some work remains to be
done around No-Envy in the compensation problem.
The literature has focused on the two models presented here, and therefore has ne-
glected issues which are not described in these models. In particular, it remains to study
the general problem of talents and handicaps which simultaneously alter an individual’s
productive abilities, her quality of life and her preferences over consumption goods. The
model of Section 3 deals only with the first dimension, the model in Section 2 with the
second dimension and may be considered to cover the third dimension only when x is in-
terpreted as income, u as indirect utility and when consumption prices are fixed. In-kind
transfers cannot be studied in this setting. In a diﬀerent direction, one may also want to
study more specific problems such as spatial inequalities (living somewhere may be seen
as a handicap in terms of living cost, access to public goods, etc.), family size, and so on.
The production model could also be refined so as to take account of the fact that agents
may be deemed responsible for some of their skill parameters, and/or the fact that they
may not be responsible for some of their preference parameters.
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